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This ‘book event’ consisted of a series of posts about Mooney’s 
book on Crooked Timber (crookedtimber.org). The event 
was organized by John Quiggin. Readers met author, semi-
nar-style; still more readers left comments, blog-style. For this 
book, the posts have been edited for typos, clarity, style and 
suitability for a slightly different medium. Page numbers for 
Mooney’s book have been updated to match the paperback 
version. A few substantial edits have been made at authors’ 
discretion. To view the unedited original posts and comments 
click the links at the end of each entry. The event archive as a 
whole has a permanent URL:
http://crookedtimber.org/category/chris-mooney-
seminar/ 
Paper has been a bit of a puzzle. We have opted to make it 
typographically clear where links appear in the electronic ver-
sion. Readers of the paper version who wish to follow links 
can download the PDF version of the book from Parlor Press, 
or check the original posts. 
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j Republican War 
on Science: 
Introduction to a Seminar
John Quiggin 
Political conflict over scientific issues has probably never been 
as sharp as at present. Issues like global warming and stem-
cell research that came to prominence in the 1990s are being 
fiercely debated. At the same time, questions that had, appar-
ently, been resolved long ago, like evolution or the US ban 
on agricultural use of DDT, are being refought. A striking 
feature of these debates is that, in nearly all cases (the one 
big exception being GM foods) the fight lines up the politi-
cal Right, and particularly the US Republican Party, on one 
side, and the majority of scientists and scientific organisations 
on the other. Chris Mooney’s book, The Republican War on 
Science, is, therefore, a timely contribution to the debate, and 
we are happy to host a seminar to discuss it, and thank Chris 
for agreeing to take part.
In addition to contributions from five members of CT, 
we’re very pleased to have two guests participating in the 
debate. Tim Lambert has been an active participant in the 
blogospheric version of some of the debates discussed by Chris. 
Tim, like the CT participants, broadly endorses Chris’ argu-
ment, though with some disagreement on analytical points 
and questions of emphasis and presentation. To broaden the 
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debate, Steve Fuller was invited to take part in the seminar, 
and kindly agreed, knowing that he would be very much in 
the minority. Steve presents a social constructivist critique of 
Chris’ argument. We’re very grateful to Steve for taking part.
I won’t attempt to summarise the debate since Chris 
Mooney, in his response, has done an excellent job.
originally posted on March 27th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/27/republican-
war-on-science-introduction-to-a-seminar/
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k The Republican 
War on Science
Henry Farrell 
Books about the politics of science policy and other compli-
cated policy areas have a hard time doing justice to the politics 
and the technical aspects both; they usually emphasize one 
and underplay the other. On the one hand, many journalistic 
accounts ham up the politics and underplay the analysis, doc-
umenting the atrocities, one after another after another. Raw 
outrage supported by anecdotes gets partisans’ juices flowing, 
but it’s not likely to persuade the unpersuaded, or provide any 
good understanding of how to solve the problem (other than 
to kick the bums out, which is a start, but only a start.) On 
the other, there are books that do an excellent job of discuss-
ing the underlying policy issues, but that lack political zing. 
Marion Nestle’s Food Politics is a good example; it provides a 
nuanced (and utterly damning) account of how the technical 
processes of food regulation have been corrupted by special 
interests, but it’s written by a policy wonk for policy wonks. 
There’s lots and lots of technical nitty gritty. The good news 
is that Chris Mooney’s book pulls off the difficult double act 
of talking about the politics in a fresh and immediate fash-
ion while paying attention to the underlying issues of institu-
tions and policies, and does it with considerable aplomb. The 
Republican War on Science is written with an eye for a good 
story, but it still has a real intellectual punch. There’s an un-
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derlying argument as to why the relationship between science 
and politics is in a parlous state. While I think that there’s an 
interesting piece missing from this argument (on which more 
below), it links the very different issues of science politics un-
der the current administration (regulation, intelligent design, 
global warming, stem cell research) into a more-or-less coher-
ent narrative.
One of the key moments in Mooney’s story—the tragedy 
of modern science policy—was the decision of the Gingrich 
Congress to get rid of Congress’s Office of Technology As-
sessment (OTA), which provided impartial assessments of sci-
entific issues that had policy implications in the 1990s. As 
Mooney documents, there were a number of reasons for this. 
The Congress claimed to want to cut down on ‘government 
waste’; getting rid of OTA was a cheap way to demonstrate 
their commitment to doing this. OTA was sometimes slow 
to deliver its reports (although it was widely lauded for doing 
an excellent job.) But the key problem, in the eyes of Gin-
grich Republicans, was that its reports were often politically 
inconvenient. OTA had made a number of enemies during 
the Reagan era, by issuing reports which reflected the sci-
entific consensus on the “Star Wars” program of missile de-
fence—that it was unworkable, and stood a significant chance 
of “catastrophic failure”. That these claims were true did little 
to endear them to Star Wars’ defenders. The result was that 
some Republicans began to see OTA as an enemy stronghold. 
Mooney’s account makes it clear that this wasn’t an universal 
perception among Republicans—one moderate Republican 
congressman mounted a defence of OTA that might well have 
succeeded. Unfortunately, this last-ditch initiative failed.
Of course, the demise of OTA isn’t the only factor con-
tributing to the corruption of science politics. However, it did 
play a quite significant role. OTA was the most important 
structure through which impartial science advice could enter 
the policy-making process, and commercial interests and re-
ligious fundamentalists have rushed to fill the vacuum that 
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it left. While there were abuses of science under the Reagan 
administration, and indeed under previous Democratic ad-
ministrations too, they weren’t systemic. As Mooney argues, 
they are now. To mention only some of the corruptions of the 
policy process that he discusses at length, the “Data Quality 
Act,” an Orwellian misnomer if ever there was one, tries to 
give business an effective veto power over scientific advice. To-
bacco firms pioneered political attacks on “junk science” (i.e. 
science that suggested that smoking was bad for your health) 
and sought to magnify scientific uncertainty, writing a play-
book that oil companies and others eagerly adopted. (In the 
words of a Brown and Williamson internal document, “doubt 
is our product.”) Senators like James Inhofe blatantly misrep-
resented and continue to misrepresent the scientific consensus 
on climate change so that they could claim that man-made 
global warming was a “hoax … perpetrated on the American 
people.” Bogus “sound science” arguments are used to attack 
the Endangered Species Act. George W. Bush makes patently 
incorrect claims about stem cell research in order to block fed-
eral funding. And so on.
A second, even more troubling set of attacks go hand-
in-hand with the corruption of the policy making process, 
amounting to an attack on the basic norms of the scientif-
ic community—peer review, principled argument, and the 
reaching of (always tentative, always open to revision, but 
nonetheless real) consensus on issues where the science on a 
topic appears to be more or less settled. The “intelligent de-
sign” movement is a quite deliberate and conscious attempt 
to drive a wedge into this consensus (or the public perception 
of this consensus), to make it appear that there is substantive 
scientific debate where there is none. So too, global warming 
contrarians, and, a couple decades ago, people who denied the 
link between CFCs and ozone depletion. Websites like Steven 
Milloy’s junkscience.com exist in order to spread doubt, 
and to make non-debates appear to be real controversies.
Henry Farrell8   
Mooney’s book delivers a damning indictment precisely 
because it shows that these various abuses aren’t unrelated; 
they’re all symptoms of the same problem, a deep-seated cor-
ruption of the policy process, linked to an attack on the basic 
principles of scientific integrity. Disinterested scientific advice 
is increasingly marginalized both in policy and in public de-
bate. Just last week, a New York Times journalist gave near-
equal hearing to biologists and Intelligent Design cranks, 
defending this with the claim that it’s the controversy that 
is newsworthy. The problem is deep-rooted; Mooney argues 
that the solution isn’t simply to turf Republicans out of office. 
Indeed, he claims that “[e]ncouraging the electoral success of 
Republican moderates with good credentials on science could 
potentially have just as constructive an effect as backing Dem-
ocrats.” More fundamental institutional reforms are needed, 
both to the policy process and to the ways in which journalists 
and others report public debates on scientific issues.
This is a terrific book—I strongly recommend it. There 
is however, one piece of the puzzle that’s missing: Mooney 
does an excellent job of describing the consequences of the 
Republican relationship with science, but misses out on some 
of its causes and intellectual justifications. There’s a complex 
ideological knot there that needs to be unentangled. The 
‘anti-science’ agenda of the modern right wing often goes 
hand-in-hand with an infatuation with the power of tech-
nology. Newt Gingrich is the prime example (Mooney more 
or less admits that there’s something he doesn’t get about 
Gingrich)—on the one hand presiding over the gutting of 
the infrastructure of science policy advice, but on the other 
pushing for a major increase in NSF funding. What gives? I 
think there’s an ideological substrate to a certain flavour of 
Republicanism, which finds its purest form in a certain kind 
of science fiction (the “competent man” SF of the 1940’s and 
1950’s) and extropian varieties of libertarianism. Here we en-
counter the implicit belief that science doesn’t impose limits, 
but instead provides tools, and that there’s no problem that 
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can’t be solved by a combination of engineering prowess and 
can-do spirit. This combines a dislike for science, when it sug-
gests, say, that the environment can be seriously degraded by 
human activity, with a boundless optimism in technology’s 
ability to solve whatever problems we face, and an underlying 
faith in a universe of effectively limitless resources. Thus the 
dislike for scientific consensus, whenever it says that we face 
constraints on our freedom of action, e.g. the faith that Star 
Wars would work, despite the many good reasons for believ-
ing that it wouldn’t. Hence also the refusal to believe that 
global warming is a real problem. This set of beliefs clearly has 
a strong elective affinity with pro-market values and is doubt-
less often highly convenient for business interests (hence the 
continued funding for Tech Central Station). But it can’t 
simply be reduced to a cynical smoke screen for material inter-
ests—there’s a real set of social beliefs there. Indeed, it’s a set 
of beliefs that is sometimes justified in practice—we do often 
underestimate the ability of human ingenuity to solve prob-
lems. However, at the end of the day it’s based on faith (in the 
boundless powers of human creativity) rather than science; 
there are material limits to our powers, even if we may some-
times be mistaken about where those limits lie. This secular 
religion—which has far fewer followers than religious fun-
damentalism but rather more intellectual coherence—helps 
explain the ideological staying power of the anti-science ten-
dency in the modern Republican movement.
 
originally posted August 30th, 2005
http://crookedtimber.org/2005/08/30/the-republi-
can-war-on-science/
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l War on Science
Ted Barlow 
I had to be on guard while reading Chris Mooney’s The 
Republican War on Science, because it’s a sterling example of a 
book that tells me what I want to hear. For the lion’s share of 
the readers of this blog, it’s what you want to hear, too. So take 
this with a grain of salt.
Mooney does not argue that Republicans or conservatives 
are anti-science in the way of the forces of liberalism are al-
leged to be anti-Christmas or pro-death. There’s no doubt 
that Republicans enjoy their iPods and CT scanners as much 
as Democrats.
Rather, he believes that the leadership of the Republican 
party has taken specific steps to reduce the power of the sci-
entific consensus on public policy. Mooney largely ignores the 
low-hanging fruit of conservative commentators, who barely 
appear in the book. Instead, the book predominantly focuses 
on top policymakers in Congress and the White House. In 
one thread, Mooney tells the story of how the Gingrich Con-
gress eliminated the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 
a scientific body that used to provide Congress with indepen-
dent expert analysis of science issues.
“Gingrich’s view was always, ‘I’ll set up one-on-
one interactions between members of Congress 
and key members of the scientific community,’” 
recalls Bob Palmer, former Democratic staff 
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director of the House Committee on Science. 
“Which I thought was completely bizarre. I 
mean, who comes up with these people, and 
who decides they’re experts, and what member 
of Congress really wants to do that?”
It wasn’t long before this latitude was abused. Rep. Sen-
ator James Inhofe, the man who called the EPA a “gestapo 
bureaucracy” and who famously suggested that manmade 
global warming was “the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on 
the American people”, was awarded the chairmanship of the 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in 1999. 
Mooney relates how Inhofe reacted to the solidifying scientif-
ic consensus on global warming. Says Mooney, “The IPCC, 
the National Academy of Sciences, the American Meteoro-
logical Society, the American Geophysical Union—all agree 
that human activity is causing climate change” (p. 84).
Inhofe led a committee hearing in 2003 which set two 
global warming sceptics with ties to the energy industry 
against one scientist, Michael Mann, to represent the main-
stream view. Mooney again:
At Inhofe’s hearing, Mann defended both his 
own work and the conclusions of the IPCC, 
which channels the work of hundreds of ex-
perts. But for those keeping track of the Senate 
that day, the intellectual ticker showed a score 
of two to one, not a handful versus a horde. 
Such was Inhofe’s conception of “balance.” At 
one point, for example, the senator asked the 
panelists whether they agreed or disagreed that 
rising carbon dioxide levels can “produce many 
beneficial effects on the natural plant and ani-
mal environments of the earth.” Here were the 
results:
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DR. SOON: I agree.
DR. MANN: I find little there to agree with.
DR. LEGATES: I would tend to agree.
 … By now, the problems with Inhofe’s attempt 
to turn Congress into a science court should be 
apparent. The validity of Michael Mann’s par-
ticular “hockey stick” analysis remains open 
to debate among experts, and has in fact been 
prominently challenged in the peer-reviewed 
literature. But holding a heated public hear-
ing between mainstream scientists and con-
trarians will hardly help determine its merits. 
“That’s why the federal government turns to 
the National Academy of the Sciences for ad-
vice, or the governments of the world turn to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” 
explains Princeton University climate expert 
Michael Oppenheimer.” (pp. 88-89)
The book catalogues a series of incidents in recent years in 
which the Republican leadership battled, ignored or muddied 
the mainsteam scientific consensus when it conflicts with the 
policy preferences of either large industrial interests or funda-
mentalist Christians.
It’s hard to argue that the solutions to all such policy prob-
lems —the resolutions of all such political arguments—lie at 
the bottom of a test tube, or in a climate model. The Repub-
lican leaders in question could have made arguments for their 
positions by arguing that moral or economic criteria some-
times trump science. There’s no objectively correct answer to 
the question of when life begins; if one accepts that a fertil-
ized egg is the moral equivalent of an infant, then it’s logical 
to consider stem-cell research the moral equivalent of murder. 
Many global warming skeptics have argued that the economic 
costs of Kyoto-like greenhouse gas emissions measures swamp 
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the forseeable benefits. Mooney mentions legislation protect-
ing food and drink companies from obesity-related lawsuits, 
which 40% of House Democrats voted for, and which many 
people (including me) would be happy to support, even know-
ing the connection between fast food and obesity.
What is not acceptable is the distortion of science to win 
the argument. Mooney argues (successfully, I think) that this 
has become a common modus operandi when the scientific 
consensus threatens the policy preferences of a Republican in-
terest group.
 
originally posted March 27th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/27/war-on-sci-
ence/
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m Worldwide 
War on Science
John Quiggin 
What do evolution, human-caused global warming and the 
adverse health effects of exposure to cigarette smoking have in 
common? All are well-established scientific facts and all have 
been vigorously denied by a network of think-tanks, politi-
cians and commentators associated with the Republican Party 
in the United States.
Of course, disputes over environmental and health issues 
have been going on for many years, and evolution has always 
been controversial in the United States. The striking develop-
ment of the last fifteen years or so is the development of a sys-
tematic approach hostile to, and subversive of, all the standard 
rules of scientific inquiry and treatment of evidence. This ap-
proach is referred to by Chris Mooney as The Republican War 
on Science.
The central rhetorical element of the War on Science is the 
abandonment of science, as the term is normally understood, 
in favour of what is called ‘sound science’, a term that first 
came to prominence with The Advancement of Sound Sci-
ence Coalition, a body primarily funded by the Philip Morris 
tobacco company. Broadly speaking, ‘sound science’ is science 
produced at the behest of relevant industry groups, though 
mainstream scientific research may be included if its results 
are politically convenient.
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Conversely, ‘junk science’ is any scientific research that 
produces results inconsistent with the financial and ideologi-
cal interests associated with the Republican Party. Not sur-
prisingly, research on the dangers of second-hand smoke has 
been a prominent target, along with climate science and other 
environmental research. The ‘junk science’ approach is most 
prominently represented at junkscience.com, a site operated 
by former TASSC head Steven Milloy and hosted by the Cato 
Institute, one of the network of industry-funded think-tanks 
that help to promote the attack on science.
Mooney documents the rise of the think-tank network, 
and the roles of commentators like Rush Limbaugh, indus-
try-funded scientists like Willie Soon and David Legates, and 
politicians like James Inhofe and Tom DeLay. He presents a 
series of case studies, covering issues including global warm-
ing, stem-cell research, the preservation of endangered spe-
cies and the effect of dietary sugar intake on obesity. In all 
these cases, factual conclusions based on extensive scientific 
research have been challenged, and in many cases rejected, on 
the basis of purely political considerations.
Even more notable is the way in which the war on science 
has exploited social norms of discussion to create a situation 
where proven falsehoods can be treated as defensible positions 
in public debate, then used as the basis of policy formulation. 
Particularly in the United States, journalists are inculcated 
with notions of ‘balance’ associated with the adage that ‘there 
are two sides to every story’. As a result, any proposition that 
is supported by a substantial body of opinion is automatically 
treated as being on a par with any other, even when there is an 
overwhelming body of scientific evidence on the other side.
Similarly, concepts of peer review and accountability have 
been used to give business groups opportunities to challenge, 
and frequently suppress, research that produces conclusions 
antithetical to their interests. Fine-sounding names like the 
Data Quality Act are used to disguise political censorship of 
research.
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Creationists have made particularly effective use of norms 
of fairness to argue that ‘Intelligent Design’ theory should 
be taught as an alternative to evolution. Mooney notes the 
‘Wedge document’ prepared by the Discovery Institute in Se-
attle, which clearly sets out the way in which the nominally 
non-religious Intelligent Design model can be used as a stalk-
ing horse for the reintroduction of Biblical creationism.
Mooney shows how the same strategies, and in many cases 
the same actors reappear in debates over many different issues, 
replacing objective scientific analysis with the kind of politi-
cized treatment of evidence familiar from claims about weap-
ons of mass destruction in the leadup to the Iraq war. The 
Marshall Institute, for example, first appears backing Star 
Wars, then denying the effects of CFCs on the ozone layer, 
and finally distorting historical climate records on climate in 
an effect to discredit research on global warming.
Repeated across almost every field of scientific research, 
the ultimate effect of the Republican strategy is to constitute 
a complete parallel universe, in which scientific ‘knowledge’ 
is derived from think-tanks and unqualified opinion writ-
ers rather than from actual scientists working on the topic in 
question. Rather than being confronted with actual evidence, 
approved views are amplified by the echo chamber of repeated 
mutual quotation until they appear as established facts.
A particularly striking case, discussed relatively briefly by 
Mooney, is that of DDT. This cheap and persistent insecticide 
was freely used for all sorts of purposes in the decades after 
World War II, but its environmental dangers were pointed out 
by Rachel Carson in her 1962 classic, Silent Spring. Carson’s 
book was met with vigorous criticism, but her main claims 
stood up well to official scrutiny and the US banned the use 
of DDT in 1972. Although some sniping continued, the case 
against widescale use of DDT was almost universally accept-
ed.
Since about 2000 however, a pro-DDT campaign has 
gone into overdrive with the publication of a string of news-
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paper opinion pieces and other articles, in publications rang-
ing from FoxNews to the New York Times. The central tenet of 
these pieces is the claim that Carson’s book and the resulting 
US ban on DDT have led to the loss of millions of lives from 
malaria in developing countries.
It takes only a few minutes work with Google to deter-
mine that this story is false in almost every particular. The 
new stories apparently arose from debates leading up to the 
2000 Johannesburg conference on persistent organochlorine 
pollution, during which some environmental groups advocat-
ing setting a date for a phaseout of DDT use. This propos-
al was ultimately withdrawn, but the debate produced some 
overheated pro-DDT rhetoric which was then amplified by 
the echo-chamber of rightwing think-tanks, and blogs com-
mentators into a legend that bears almost no relationship to 
reality.
There has never been a global ban on DDT use as an an-
timalarial, and it has been in continuous use in a number of 
countries. The abandonment of DDT in particular countries 
has been mainly due to the development of resistance by mos-
quitoes, which has rendered infeasible the original goal of 
eradication.
The most important remaining use of DDT is as a spray 
inside houses or huts. This strategy is supported by the agen-
cies such as WHO and USAID in some cases, but is common-
ly regarded as less effective than the use of insecticide-treated 
bednets. In middle-income and richer countries, and where 
resistance is a problem, insecticides other than DDT have 
been used.
A striking feature of the true story is that bans on the agri-
cultural use of DDT (such as the US ban in 1972) have actu-
ally saved lives by inhibiting the development of resistance.
The same parallel universe may be observed in relation 
to global warming. The consensus view, that the increase in 
greenhouse gases arising from human activity has driven a 
warming trend that will accelerate in future is backed up by 
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thousands of scientific studies, painstakingly assembled by 
the IPCC. Against this, Republicans and their allies solemnly 
quote the work of such luminaries as science fiction writer 
Michael Crichton and retired mining executive Steven Mc-
Intyre.
All of these innovations have been exported to Australia, 
though they have sometimes struggled to take root here. As 
in the United States, a large group of commentators has pre-
ferred to take its scientific information from the parallel uni-
verse created by the Republican machine rather than from 
mainstream science. Miranda Devine and Michael Duffy 
have peddled the DDT myth. The Institute of Public Affairs 
has rejected mainstream science on passive smoking and pro-
moted research commissioned by the (now-dissolved) Tobac-
co Institute of Australia.
The teaching of creationism is much less of a hot button 
issue in Australia than in America, partly because belief in 
Biblical literalism is much weaker here and partly because of 
public funding of religious schools, which are effectively free 
to treat the issue as they please. Nevertheless, it has received 
support in surprising quarters. Right-wing columnist Andrew 
Bolt, for example, has attacked critics of intelligent design, 
while maintaining a studied neutraltity regarding his own 
views on the question. And lobbyists have been pushing the 
issue to Education Minister Brendan Nelson, who raised the 
possibility that Intelligent Design might be taught in Austra-
lian schools.
The central issue of concern, though, has been global 
warming. In addition to regular visits from US contrarians, 
Australia has its own Lavoisier Institute. The adoption of fa-
mous names to push positions that would probably have hor-
rified the eponymous individuals is a characteristic feature of 
the war on science.
Despite valiant attempts, though, the war on science has 
been far less successful in Australia than in the US. Although 
the Australian government has fallen into line with the Bush 
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Administration in opposing the Kyoto protocol, it has repeat-
edly reaffirmed its support for mainstream climate science.
Not surprisingly, Mooney’s book has received plenty of 
criticism. The first line of argument, made routinely in re-
sponse to any criticism of the Bush Administration is that 
their opponents, and in particular Clinton’s Democratic Ad-
ministration, were just as bad. Mooney is prepared for this 
line and sees it off in his opening pages. While noting some 
instances of exaggeration or misuse of scientific evidence 
among opponents of the Republicans, on issues such as genet-
ically modified foods and the short-run therapeutic potential 
of stem cells, Mooney argues persuasively that these offences 
are trivial by comparison with the systematic assault on sci-
ence launched by the Republicans.
One way of defending this conclusion is to compare the 
range and scale of these spurious claims. It’s easy enough to 
find scientifically dubious claims about the dangers of geneti-
cally modified foods, but even these have come mostly from 
radical green groups, such as Greenpeace, and from individu-
al campaigners. There are few issues on which Democrats in 
the US, or social democrats and liberals elsewhere, have taken 
a position that is obviously at variance with the findings of 
mainstream science. By contrast, there is almost no scientific 
discipline, from geological analysis of the age of the earth to 
epidemiology to climate science that has not been subject to 
ideological attack from Republicans and associated interests.
Even more striking, though, is the institutional record. 
The Republicans, in Congress and in the Bush Administra-
tion, have scrapped or undermined institutions that promot-
ed objective scientific analysis as a basis for policy formation 
and turned instead to procedures designed to give control to 
ideologues and financial interest. This process began in the 
Gingrich era, when the Office of Technology Assessment was 
scrapped, apparently because of its role in discrediting the 
Strategic Defensive Initiative missile-defence system, better 
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known as ‘Star Wars’. The process has been expanded greatly 
under Bush
A more subtle and effective criticism, put forward by 
Daniel Sarewitz is that, in effect, the Republicans are 
right. The kind of purity set forth as an ideal by Mooney, is in 
Sarewitz’s view unattainable.
Mooney’s “polemical fervor blinds him to the political con-
tent inherent in all discourse that connects science to human 
affairs.”
As an example, Mooney attacks Republicans for mak-
ing false claims about the usefulness of adult stem cells as a 
substitute for embryonic stem cells in research. Sarewitz sug-
gests that, since Germany has prohibited embryonic stem cells 
research, Germans must, by the terms of Mooney’s analyis, 
share a disdain for science with Republicans.
But Sarewitz is missing the point here. Mooney does not 
deny that it is open to societies to decide, on ethical grounds, 
to forgo the medical progress that might be achieved as a re-
sult of stem cell research. Rather, he suggests that such a deci-
sion should be made in the light of the best available evidence 
on costs and benefits and criticises Republicans for fabricating 
and distorting that evidence. In his critique, Sarewitz provides 
no evidence that similar distortion was practised in Germa-
ny.
In effect, here we are back to the fact-value distinction that 
was at the centre of 20th century debates about positivism. 
In Mooney’s view, scientists do their best (or should do their 
best) to determine the facts that should inform public debate. 
It is then up to political processes to determine the course of 
action most consistent with the values held by the public. By 
contrast, Sarewitz views the two as inextricably entwined, to 
the point where he does not appear to be aware that such a 
distinction might be suggested.
In the 20th century, rejection of the fact-value distinction 
came mostly from the left, first from Marxists who saw all 
truth-claims made in a class society as being incorrigibly satu-
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rated with ideology and then from postmodernists and social 
constructivists who attacked the whole idea of an indepen-
dently existing truth, which might be ascertained, or at least 
approached, by scientific inquiry.
One of the central conceits of postmodernism has been to 
pluralise abstract nouns like truth, abandoning attempts at a 
unified view of the world in favour of a celebration of differ-
ence. The great lesson learned by postmodern Republicans 
has been that, where multiple ‘truths’ contend, the ‘truth’ fa-
voured by powerful interests is likely to prevail. Since scien-
tific truth is refractory and not amenable to political control, 
its claims to special privilege must be challenged, in order that 
politically reliable alternatives such as ‘sound science’ can re-
place it.
While the adoption of postmodernist positions has most-
ly been done without acknowledgement (perhaps because of 
memories of the 1990s ‘Science Wars’ when denunciation of 
postmodernism was de rigeur on the right), there have been 
exceptions. Leading Intelligent Design advocate Philip John-
son has noted the influence of postmodernist critical theory 
on the development of his views.
The social constructivist position is represented in this 
seminar by Steve Fuller, who testified on the ID side in the 
recent Dover court case over the teaching of Intelligent De-
sign, so rather than attempt to summarise it, I’ll leave him to 
put it forward, then respond in discussion.
Mooney suggests a range of institutional responses to 
these developments most notably the revival of the Office of 
Technology Assessments. It is clear, however, that the crucial 
changes involve political debate and its reporting. In particu-
lar, it is necessary to overcome the presumption that scientific 
propositions should be treated as matters of political opinion,
As regards the established media, we have a long way to 
go. The Australian and US press give more space to ideologi-
cal attacks on climate science than to the actual findings of 
science. For example, in the week leading up to the meeting 
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of the Asia-Pacific Climate Pact in Sydney all of the major 
Australian ‘quality’ dailies published opinion pieces by con-
trarians attacking climate science.
The rise of the internet has been a mixed blessing. On the 
one hand, it has generated an almost hermetically-sealed echo 
chamber, in which science warriors can circulate, adapt and 
modify the factoids, talking points and bogus quotations that 
are the stock in trade of opinion pieces like those mentioned 
above.
On the other hand, for anyone who is aware of the general 
strategy adopted by the advocates of ‘sound science’, resources 
like Google and Wikipedia provide immediate confirmation 
in particular instances. In the past, an opinion piece by, say, 
Steven Milloy, would appear with an uninformative or mis-
leading byline, and would be given the benefit of the doubt 
by most readers. Now, anyone who performs a basic check can 
discover, with little effort, the full history of his efforts as to-
bacco lobbyist and hired gun for polluting industries.
What is needed, therefore is general awareness of the ex-
istence of an organised campaign against science, in which 
the Bush Administration plays a leading role. As Mooney 
observes, scientists must launch counter-campaigns to blunt 
the impact of widespread misinformation on the media and 
public. Merely by making it clear that the war against science 
is taking place, and that the current leadership of the Repub-
lican Party is on the wrong side, scientists will help to change 
the terms of debate. Winning the debate will require scientists 
to learn new and unfamiliar ways of communicating, in the 
face of the professional distortions of the anti-science lobby. 
Still, even if scientists are sometimes outmanoeuvred in de-
bate, the experience of the debate over intelligent design, the 
one case where scientists have mounted a concerted response 
to their intellectual enemies, suggests that truth will out in 
the end.
originally posted March 27th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/27/worldwide-
war-on-science/
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n The Stars and Stripes 
Down to Earth 
Daniel Davies  
Chris Mooney’s book, The Republican War on Science, seems 
to me a very American book. It’s not that Europe is bereft of 
“sound science” hacks trying to influence the process by which 
regulations are made, or even of our own brand of home-grown 
irrationalists of one kind or another. However, America does 
seem to have a hell of a lot of them, and they seem to pick bat-
tlegrounds (like creation science, to take the clearest example) 
which suggest that the purpose of a lot of the Republican War 
on Science is not so much to push an alternative pseudo-sci-
entific agenda for political and economic gain, but rather to 
knock scientists off their pedestal for the sake of doing so.
Because I’m not really familiar with the ins and outs of 
American regulatory politics which are the meat of TRWOS, 
I thought I’d pursue this line of thinking a bit further. What 
I mean to suggest is that to a certain extent Chris has got the 
causation wrong in his underlying analysis of the Republi-
can War on Science. In other words, it’s not so much a case of 
vested interests wanting to tear down good science in order to 
replace it with bad science that supports economically conve-
nient conclusions, as a case of the hack science being generated 
in order to fill a vacuum created by an original desire at the 
heart of right wing politics to bring down good science for the 
sake of doing so.
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I think that this causal story fits the facts at least as well as 
the more obvious one and perhaps even a bit better. After all, 
there is a clear economic interest in trying to ensure that rare 
species are miscounted or that the impact of pollution is un-
derestimated; there’s no need for any other explanation there. 
But there is rather less obvious economic interest in trying to 
deny the facts about global warming, still less in pretending 
that DDT (a commodity chemical) is a panacea for malaria 
and as far as I can see none at all in “intelligent design”. In-
telligent design isn’t even a particularly congenial theory for 
fundamentalist Christians to be pushing, as it appears to me 
to be inconsistent with the literal truth of the Book of Gen-
esis, which was surely the only point in opposing the teaching 
of evolution in the first place.
So if there’s a unifying reason behind all these different 
phenomena (and it is surely the thesis of TRWOS that there 
is), then I don’t think it can be narrow self-interest. I think 
it’s something more like the “authoritarian irrationalism” that 
Theodor Adorno identified in books like The Stars Down To 
Earth, and that, in its guise of anti-intellectualism, De Toc-
queville identified before that as being particularly common 
in American public life. I realise that Adorno’s theory is right 
out of fashion these days, but it’s always appealed to me and 
I think it has decent explanatory power over this phenom-
enon.
There is a particular kind of irrationalism Adorno iden-
tified, which is characteristic of authoritarian politics (and 
therefore also, I hardly need to say, of the kind of authoritar-
ian politics which these days calls itself “libertarian” but never 
saw a pro-business law it didn’t like.) It’s rooted in status inse-
curity and a consequent distrust of ambiguity. Adorno’s book 
carried out an analysis of the astrology columns in the Los 
Angeles Times, demonstrating how their underlying theme was 
always the same; they encouraged the readers to believe that 
there was an underlying order to the world, that following 
simple rules was always the right thing to do, and that behav-
ing in the “right” fashion would always have the right results. 
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The readers of the astrology column probably didn’t believe 
that the stars controlled their destiny. But, by pretending that 
they did, they were able to reduce the stress caused by the fact 
that whatever controlled the readers of the astrology column’s 
lives, they themselves didn’t.
This is the root of authoritarian irrationalism. For people 
who are status-insecure (which Adorno argues is the root of 
authoritarian politics—he notes that second-generation im-
migrants systematically score much higher for right-wing 
politics than other groups), the fact that the real world is a 
complicated, ambiguous and uncertain place creates intoler-
able stress. The defensive reaction to this stress is a retreat to 
somewhere safer and more predictable; a world in which the 
unpleasant facts of the matter are simply denied and their oc-
casional intrusions explained away as being most likely the 
result of some shadowy conspiracy.
And when you look at the Republican War on Science 
through this sort of a lens, it makes a bunch of sense. It is 
intolerably stressful for technological process to be both good 
for the economy and bad for the environment. Or for science 
(which is good) to contradict religion (which is also good). 
Or for the companies that create the modern world to be also 
selling us dangerous products. So, the “science” that shows 
that all of these things are happening has to be denied and 
rejected. Thus, a world of “sound science” is created, and real 
science is portrayed as a conspiracy of ideologically motivated 
men. I think that Mooney is correct to identify “sound sci-
ence” as a creation of the PR industry, but the PR industry 
can’t create something unless it has some basic desires to work 
with. If the audience for “sound science” was thinking at all, 
nobody would be fooled, so we do need a theory of why it is 
that they aren’t thinking, and I think that Adorno’s is quite 
convincing. Or, in other words, it makes no sense for scientists 
to tear their hair out about the state of science politics and 
blame it on “the low quality of scientific journalism”. There 
is no other kind of scientific journalism possible. It’s certainly 
not realistic to hope for popular acceptance of confidence in-
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tervals, the tentative nature of scientific theories and the differ-
ing standards of proof and certainty, because this is just more 
of the ambiguity that has already been judged intolerable by a 
large chunk of the American polity in much more diluted form. 
The underlying problem is one of political psychology and it’s 
not going away.
Which leaves two questions; could there be a “Democratic 
War on Science”, and is this purely an American phenomenon?
I think that the answer to the first is yes there could. There 
are authoritarians on the political left of the spectrum as well as 
the right, and I can’t help but notice that it is in the American 
university system that quite sensible French theories of literary 
criticism have been given a specifically irrationalist interpreta-
tion that was never really there in the originals. But I think that 
the answer to the second is also yes it is. There is a lot of anti-sci-
ence thinking in Europe (and I’m sure there is in Asia, too, but I 
don’t know much about it. ) But it has a much less specifically ir-
rationalist cast to it, using the term in Adorno’s sense. It is prob-
ably irrational (in the everyday language sense) of Europeans 
to be so implacably opposed to genetically modified food, but 
their opposition is not in general cast in “irrationalist” terms; it’s 
based on “despite what the science says, I don’t believe it” rather 
than “the science cannot possibly be saying that because I don’t 
want to believe it.” And I don’t think that this is a coincidence. 
Authoritarian politics in general are these days much less com-
mon in Europe than in America. I don’t know why the politics 
of status insecurity are more common in the last remaining great 
world power, or why they have got more rather than less influen-
tial since the end of the Cold War, but I suggest that this is the 
root of the troubled relationship between American politics and 
American science, and that because of this, the Republican War 
on Science is likely to get worse rather than better.
originally posted, March 27th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/27/the-stars-and-
stripes-down-to-earth-posted-for-daniel-davies-by-hf/
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o Mooney Minus 
the Polemic?
John Holbo 
‘War on science’ sounds halfway between ‘war on Christmas’ 
and ‘war on terror’; that is, halfway between something that 
can’t possibly be real and something that is real enough, but 
probably misdescribed. The title hints at a sinister—well, you 
see. The worry is the thing is afflicted with a touch of the 
paranoid style.
Still, sometimes they are out to get you. 
The Republican War on Science is a good read, and not just 
because I quite like a little hyperventilation. 
I’ve read reviews that accuse Mooney of polemic; some se-
riously, polemically negative reviews.1 I don’t care to reheat 
that. I think such criticism is misplaced. Still, a potboiling 
polemical style will deform presentation in predictable ways, 
leading to these sorts of misunderstandings. Let’s consider.
First, there is concern about choir-preaching. Consider 
the recent Pew Research Center Report that found, 
among other things, that substantial numbers of Republicans 
are so-called Enterprisers: “The staunchly conservative En-
terprisers have perhaps the most consistent ideological profile 
of any group in the typology. They are highly patriotic and 
strongly pro-business, oppose social welfare and overwhelm-
ingly support an assertive foreign policy. This group is largely 
white, well-educated, affluent and male—more than three-
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quarters are men. While Enterprisers are a bit less religious 
than the other GOP groups, they are socially conservative in 
most respects.” What you’ve got here is your basic Newt Gin-
grich—to a lesser extent, your Glenn Reynolds, Tech Central 
Station-type. Being pro-science is, on average, part of your 
self-conception if you are an ‘enterpriser’. You are an optimis-
tic believer in the power of technology and science to generate 
wealth and improve human life. This lot will look at Mooney’s 
cover and feel personally slandered. ‘How can I be part of a 
war on science? I think the X-Prize is great! I want science to 
make me live forever! I love my new digital camera! Liber-
als are the ones who are always refusing to look at the facts. 
Look what they did to poor Larry Summers because he tried 
to speak truth to power! They buried their heads in the sand 
when The Bell Curve came out! Whimpering about ‘franken-
food’. Postmodern nonsense! What the academy needs is a 
return to reason! They’re arrogant and elitist and they want 
to cram their lefty values down everyone’s throats, packaged 
as ‘science’! (Like that smug scientist bastard in The Day The 
Earth Stood Still, who helped the alien turn everyone’s cars off 
to teach them a lesson. That’s academic science for you. Tell-
ing everyone how to live their lives.)’
However many grains of truth you think you see in this 
heap, it’s clear there will be enough sand in some eyes to keep 
War on Science from a fully considerate reception. I don’t 
want to be naive and say: if only you reasoned with them in a 
friendly, respectful way, you could make them see. One of the 
things the Pew research shows is that this lot is ideologically 
consistent, which suggests a certain partisan hardening. They 
won’t peel easy. The more libertarian ones will stick with ‘pox 
on both your houses.’ Still, one ought to try. At any rate, 
a less polemical performance of the thesis is worth rehearsing 
if only to the choir. (Not that you can’t sing the other version. 
There are actually good reasons to have two versions.)
‘War on science’. I’m guessing that was marketing’s idea. 
The notion is suggestive of the absurd. A meeting of the cabal: 
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ID-supporter (Ned Flanders) and ‘sound science’ industry 
apologist (Homer hired as a flack). Roll clip of Homer and 
Lisa debating on Kent Brockman’s show. Lisa is cut off before 
she can finish. “Well, the only reasonable thing to conclude is 
that you’re both half right. And that’s my two cents.” Monty 
Burns explains that he paid to have Lisa’s school report on 
nuclear waste trashed not because the truth would have cost 
him millions but because there’s a war on science: “We must 
prevail, because—so it has been written—against stupidity, 
even the Gods must strive in vail. These Democrats, gentle-
men, are no Gods! To ignorance! TO IGNORANCE!” Pro-
fessor Frink suddenly falls through the skylight: “ah, with the 
biasing and the fringe sciencing and the phony journalistic 
balancizing ba-hey!”
(Mooney knows I’m laughing with him. I like his book.) 
Anyway, being anti-science is not anyone’s idea of an end, 
with respect to which individual acts of stupidity are perpe-
trated as calculated means. Mooney never says otherwise. But, 
preoccupied with bringing our indignation to a steady boil, he 
does not lay out, clearly and comprehensively, exactly what he 
thinks instead of any silly conspiracy theory. He quotes the 
Union of Concerned Scientists on misrepresentations, sup-
pressions and sundry tamperings (p. 238): “Other adminis-
trations have, on occasion, engaged in such practices, but not 
so systematically nor on so wide a front.” Grant the wide front 
(I do, and not just for the sake of argument); the systematic-
ity is still a BIG question-mark. Is the claim really that the 
corruption is qualitatively different, i.e. more ‘systematic’, in 
addition to just plain being more? Or is the charge just that 
there is a bigger pile because it’s a bigger elephant (because it 
certainly has grown.)
The book concludes: 
This political movement has patently demon-
strated that it will not defend the integrity of 
science in any case in which science runs afoul 
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of its core political constituencies. In so doing, 
it has ceded any right to govern a technologi-
cally advanced and sophisticated nation. Our 
future relies on our intelligence but today’s 
Right—failing to grasp this fact in virtually ev-
ery political situation in which it really matters, 
and nourishing disturbing anti-intellectual ten-
dencies—cannot deliver us there successfully or 
safely. If it will not come to its senses, we must 
cast it aside. (p. 269)
The first sentence says it: there isn’t a war on science. Sci-
ence is collateral damage in a driveby shooting aimed at … 
what? What way is it science gets in, and why? I should stop 
right here, for I am no science journalist like Mooney. Nev-
ertheless, a few suggestions. Obviously I’m inducting from 
the data set Mooney himself has provided. (Really, it’s a great 
read.) Obviously Mooney sees perfectly well what I am sug-
gesting. But I feel that … well, the polemic prevents Mooney’s 
own pretty clear implications from getting expressed with 
sufficient analytic clarity. Getting clear is both important in 
itself, and probably genuinely important for purposes of con-
verting at least a few on the other side.
Chris Mooney is not made of stone, so he helps himself to 
the most delicious slice of sweet philosophic stupidity served 
up, lo these past six years. The ‘reality-based community’ 
thing from the ‘senior advisor’ to the President quoted in the 
2004 Ron Susskind NY Times article:
The aide said that guys like me were “in what 
we call the reality-based community,” which 
he defined as people who believe that solutions 
emerge from your judicious study of discern-
ible reality.” I nodded and mumbled something 
about enlightenment principles and empiricism. 
He cut me off. “That’s not the way the world 
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really works anymore,” he continued. “We’re 
an empire now, and when we act, we create our 
own reality.” (quoted, p. 257)
And so we have gotten (genuinely funny) jokes about the 
‘postmodern presidency’. I’ve done a spot of that myself. Kid-
ding aside: with these folks we’ve got a compound of Machia-
vellianism, zealotry, and—in foreign policy matters—hubris. 
That last ingredient may presently be evaporating upon con-
tact with reality. At any rate, let’s consider Machiavellianism 
and zealotry. We know what this is. It’s clear that sometimes 
ignoring facts—lying—can be shrewd. You know what you 
want. An inconvenient fact obtrudes. Ignoring it, blowing past 
it, may work. First, if you suspect those who unearthed the 
fact are your political enemies, they may be coloring things in 
to suit their ends and values, so you may as a matter of heu-
ristic strategy opt always to lean the other way. Second, some-
one may find a solution to the problem later—happens all the 
time in science. Third, by the time it gets really bad it may 
be someone else’s problem. Or at least you will have enough 
power not to take responsibility. Zealotry compounds this. 
Machiavellians on a mission from God are exemplary when 
it comes to ignoring inconvenient truths. There is not much 
mystery in the fact that such personality types can thrive in 
politics. And there you have the Bush/Rove problem. But why 
pin it on Republicans generally? Well, yes, they have to take 
responsibility for Bush. But beyond that, is there something 
about the current system, the specific nexus of politics and 
policy and science that obtains at present, that especially se-
lects for this type? If so, has this system arisen by accident or 
design?
Obviously in the past it has been the case that some on 
the left sacrificed science to political values—or at least to 
specific goals. Mooney himself mentions Lysenko. There you 
go. Zealous leftists are capable of disregarding, of being blind-
ly arrogant, etc. Activists, reformers, revolutionaries on both 
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wings tend to get tired of ‘it’ll never work’, because they feel 
this is almost always a lazy excuse for not trying, or just a 
straightforward attempt to block what is properly an argu-
ment about ends. So they tune out skepticism, often with di-
sastrous results. Technocratic consent-manufacturers smuggle 
values into findings, disguised as facts, feeling it is at once 
their duty and privilege to impose values on others. Of course 
the line on the right is to claim that this is what we have in 
fact got—entrenched, detached, arrogant academic elitists. 
This is not plausible, mind you, but protesting the very notion 
will fail to convince. Let me quote another bit from Mooney:
Testifying before a National Academy of Science 
panel in July 2004, Michigan Republican con-
gressman Vernon Ehlers, himself a physicist and 
generally regarded as a champion of science, 
defended the practice of asking advisory com-
mittee appointees about their voting records 
and party affiliation. “I think it’s an appropri-
ate question. I don’t think scientists should con-
sider themselves a privileged class—that politics 
is for everyone else and not for them,” Ehlers 
stated, In effect, he blessed the notion of divid-
ing science into “Republican” and “Democratic” 
camps. (To some extent, scientists may well di-
vide this way, but there is no reason to make 
matters worse.)
When the National Academy released its 
final report, it unequivocally rejected Ehler’s 
position. “It is no more appropriate to ask S&T 
[science & technology] experts to provide non-
relevant information—such as voting record, 
political-party affiliation, or position on partic-
ular policies—than to ask them other personal 
immaterial information, such as hair color or 
height,” wrote the committee. But the damage 
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had been done. A prominent Republican and sci-
entist had taken a stance in favor of science po-
liticization to defend the administration. . . . (p. 
258)
Mooney, following the National Academy statement, pro-
tests too much. Ehlers looks to be engaged in partisan water-
carrying. But—as Mooney himself says at other points—it’s 
unrealistic to think partisan affiliation is as irrelevant as, say, 
hair color. Mooney would be suspicious of a scientific com-
mittee that found in favor of policies favored by Republi-
cans, which turned out to be stacked with Republicans. That 
would send up a little warning flag. Mooney advocates full-
disclosure in ‘science court’ cases. “Congress should imple-
ment mechanisms to ensure full disclosure of any potentially 
relevant conflict of interests by witnesses invited to testify at 
hearings at the time of their testimony. such a step would at 
least partially deter the worst excesses of the “science court” 
tradition” (p. 264). Obviously an apologist for these courts 
might say: ‘scientists may indeed divide between ‘industry-
friendly’ and not. But there is no need to make matters worse 
by dragging this fact into the light.’ Well, the goose-gander 
concern is clear enough. Even if they are engaged in a bit of 
partisan maneuvering, there is every reason to think that the 
likes of Ehlers seriously think full partisan disclosure would 
be a salutary ‘sunlight’ measure.
Let me conclude by modestly suggesting that what is need-
ed is a more explanatory argument for the systematic inferior-
ity of the Republican party on science matters. This needs to 
take seriously, if only hypothetically, the view that right par-
tisanship just balances out left partisanship. The way to rebut 
this line is to specify and document systematic tendencies on 
the right which are absent, or less present, on the left, and 
which are not counterbalanced by any uniquely leftish bad 
tendency. There are, by my count, really just two major can-
didate factors: culture war and corruption by deep-pocketed 
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industries/corporations. The right has a significant constitu-
ency that is not exactly anti-science, but gratified by a sense of 
science as culturally subordinate to Christianity. Fights over 
evolution are about pride. But this starts on the right. The 
blogosphere’s most stalwart ID scourge, PZ Myers, didn’t go 
into biology to fight ID’ers. But the ID’ers definitely went 
into biology to achieve a sense of superiority over the likes of 
PZ. All the same, there is a certain tokenism to this culture 
war. Science must be compelled to bend the knee on a few 
public occasions. But everyone knows science makes DVD 
players. We want those. Attacks on science on the cultural 
front are never going to go too far. As annoyed as PZ is by the 
ID’ers, I suspect that straightforward corruption is the much 
bigger ticket item. If it is possible to buy scientific influence; if 
politicians can cherry-pick scientific ‘results’; then money can 
buy facts. Certain sorts of facts (or their suppression) are so 
valuable that they will be bought if they can be. Republicans 
are the party of business, so they will be disproportionately 
corrupted. There is no way to ‘privatize’ this sort of scientific 
inquiry so that the profit motive follows finding truth, rather 
than pleasing those willing to pay for certain truths. So gung-
ho X-Prize boosterism as a model of how science should be 
done doesn’t fly in these contexts. (Please note: this is not an 
argument, it is an outline of an argument.) So then you have, 
not a ‘war on science’ but a money-trail, leading to a ‘science 
sold to the highest bidder’ model.
What I want is for Mooney to present a polemic-free ver-
sion of his thesis, just to get clear about these things.

And that’s where my original piece stopped. I’ve edited it, 
mostly for clarity. Chris responded—not fully, but I did basi-
cally ask him to write a new book. I wish I had made clearer 
that I can perfectly well see that what he writes in his response 
is already implied by what he wrote. The only issue is that, 
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because it is somewhat contradicted by the rhetoric—which 
builds extra indignance by laying on the intentionality—the 
implications are never really analyzed explicitly, though they 
are unmissable by any moderately charitable reader. He clear-
ly isn’t a conspiracy theorist, nor a practitioner of the para-
noid style, but what other thing he is instead isn’t quite explicit 
enough. I ended up pushing that point to the point of de-
manding proof that the systematic tendencies on the Republi-
can side will continue to be worse than any on the other side. 
Since that is a flagrant impossibility, I should have asked for 
something saner. Maybe: a rhetorically compelling response 
to the narrative frame invariably deployed by the other side 
on the science question. In his response to my post (p. 86) 
Mooney quotes Quiggin:
There are few issues on which Democrats in the 
US, or social democrats and liberals elsewhere 
have taken a position that is obviously at vari-
ance with the findings of mainstream science. 
By contrast, there is almost no scientific disci-
pline, from geological analysis of the age of the 
earth to epidemiology to climate science that 
has not been subject to ideological attack from 
Republicans and associated interests.
The problem with this is that, although plausibly true and 
crucial (I don’t have a problem), it doesn’t really address one of 
the main sources of conservative concern: trumped up social 
science. In my post I linked to Glenn “Instapundit” Reynolds 
and very next day he posted about the politics of psychol-
ogy; that is, the suspicion that leftwing psychology profes-
sors dress up partisan value-judgments as empirical results. I 
think a big part of the response to this sort of concern should 
be: but this really isn’t all that consequential, even if it’s true 
that you can dig up some earnest lefty scientists engaging in 
it (which is plausible enough for me to grant, for the sake of 
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the argument.) You can be annoyed this, by all means, if you 
are on the right. You can criticize it. But at the end of the 
day it’s small potatos, in terms of its impact on policy. So you 
shouldn’t pretend it balances out the cases Mooney discusses, 
which are more serious. (Again, this isn’t an argument, merely 
a possible outline of one.)
Notes
1. See, for example, this Washington Post review, by Keay 
Davidson (Sept 18, 2005): “At best, the book is a handy summary 
of familiar stories about the Bush administration’s comic-opera 
style of making science policy. But the stories here seem curiously 
disconnected; if they’re covertly linked by a systematic, subterranean 
Republican conspiracy against science, Mooney has failed to uncover 
it.”
originally posted March 27th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/27/mooney-minus-
the-polemic/
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p War with the Newts
Henry Farrell 
I’ve already reviewed Chris’ book at length (pp. 5–9), and 
talked there about why I liked it. What I want to do in this 
contribution is to develop the line I argued was missing from 
the book. Short version: Chris presents latterday Republican 
science policy as the product of an unholy alliance between 
big business and the religious right. He laments the powerless-
ness of traditional moderate Republicans who believed that 
science and scientific truth are good and important. This al-
lows him to get at an awful lot of what is wrong about the 
Republican party’s current approach to science. But it misses 
out on something important. There’s a strand of Republican 
thinking—represented most prominently by Newt Gingrich 
and by various Republican-affiliated techno-libertarians—
that has a much more complicated attitude to science. Chris 
more or less admits in the book that he doesn’t get Newt, who 
on the one hand helped gut OTA (or at the very least stood 
passively to one side as it was gutted) but on the other hand 
has been a proponent of more funding for many areas of the 
sciences. I want to argue that getting Newt is important.
What drives Newt and people like him? Why are they so 
vigorously in favour of some kinds of science, and so opposed to 
others? The answer lies, I think, in an almost blindly optimis-
tic set of beliefs about technology and its likely consequences 
when combined with individual freedom. Technology doesn’t 
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equal science of course; this viewpoint is sometimes pro-sci-
ence, sometimes anti- and sometimes orthogonal to science as 
it’s usually practiced. Combining some half-baked sociology 
with some half-arsed intellectual history, I want to argue that 
there is a pervasive strain of libertarian thought (strongly in-
fluenced by a certain kind of science fiction) that sees future 
technological development as likely to empower individuals, 
and thus as being highly attractive. When science suggests 
a future of limitless possibilities for individuals, people with 
this orientation tend to be vigorously in its favour. When, in-
stead, science suggests that there are limits to how technology 
can be developed, or problems that aren’t readily solved by 
technological means, people with this orientation tend either 
to discount it or to be actively hostile to it.
If poets are the unacknowledged legislators of mankind 
at large, science fiction authors are the legislators of modern 
libertarianism. Not an original point I know—it’s commonly 
acknowledged that there’s an elective affinity between a cer-
tain strain of SF and modern US style libertarianism. The 
two emerged in conversation with each other—the SF of A.E. 
van Vogt, mid to late period Heinlein and others took basic 
libertarian tropes, and sent them back with topspin. The indi-
vidual against the state. The individual as superhuman. Space 
as the high frontier. An implicit faith that there’s no problem 
out there that can’t be solved by some guy with ingenuity and 
an engineering degree. More recently, there’s Neal Stephen-
son, and the even more influential novels, short stories and 
occasional essays of Vernor Vinge, who is one of the most 
influential libertarian intellectuals today. (You could make a 
plausible case for him being the most influential; and, in my 
opinion, not undeservedly so.) Vinge’s idea of the Singulari-
ty—a point in the near future at which technology accelerates 
out of control and the future goes non-linear—has been taken 
up with gusto by SF authors. The predicted future in which 
we all upload to computers, go posthuman or whatever, has 
been unkindly described as the Rapture of the Nerds by Ken 
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MacLeod. But it provides some powerfully attractive ideas 
and metaphors for libertarians—specifically, ideas about and 
metaphors of how technology can crush bureaucracies and 
liberate the individual. It also represents a kind of pure distil-
lation of a particular set of libertarian myths, in which new 
technology serves as a kind of magical pixie dust that dis-
solves complicated political, social and environmental prob-
lems into nothingness.
Take as Exhibit One, Glenn Reynolds’ recent book, An 
Army of Davids, in which home brewing merges into DIY 
teddybear construction into blogging into nanotechnology 
into individual powered spaceflight and it all gloms togeth-
er with the Singularity. If there’s a connecting thread in the 
book (and it’s a pretty weak thread at times), it’s an argument 
that technology is leading to a radical widening of individual 
choices. What is interesting to me about this is the under-
lying vision of technology and politics that this book (and 
other books and articles like it) represent. On the one hand, 
it’s not anti-science. Glenn can’t wait for this brave new world 
to come into being; he’s quite convinced that he and home-
recording ballista-building machine-gun toting wargamers 
everywhere are going to do pretty well in it. Blessed are the 
geeks, for they shall inherit the earth. He’s vigorously in fa-
vour of stem cells, nanotechnology, and a laissez faire attitude 
to scientific research in general. But there’s also something a 
little weird about his enthusiasm. It’s less an excitement about 
science as such than about technology, or for that subset of 
scientific speculation and facts which suggest that there aren’t 
any fundamental limits to human ingenuity. Scientific results 
which suggest that there are such limits don’t seem to make it 
through his filter.
Take as Exhibit Two, Tech Central Station. As Chris 
and others have documented, it’s a shill website, run by a 
crowd of corporate lobbyists to push articles that favour 
their interests. Less Tech than Flack. But there’s still, if not 
an ethos there, at least a carefully burnished PR image that 
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runs through its pieces, an idea of technology, libertarian 
economics and free markets combining to free the individ-
ual, all provided that evil government bureaucrats aren’t al-
lowed to interfere. The site has a certain appeal because of this 
image—without a spuriously independent organizing myth 
of this sort, it probably wouldn’t be worth its funders’ money 
and time. It suggests a certain vision of the future, which may 
in practice be anti-science much of the time (at least when sci-
ence comes into conflict with corporate interests), but which 
doesn’t sound anti-scientific.
Take, finally, Newt Gingrich himself. On the one hand, 
enthusiastic for technological development, and indeed for 
more funding for the sciences; on the other, a keen proponent 
of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which got written into the 
Contract with America under his watch, despite the consen-
sus among a large number of serious scientists that the pro-
gram was simply unworkable (I suspect that the Star Wars 
program serves as a kind of litmus test for the subset of techno 
libertarians that I’m writing about; if you’re one of them, you 
were and probably are still for it.) Newt is almost a paradig-
matic example of the technology geek unleashed on politics, 
with fascinating albeit frequently awful results. (Newt may be 
quite crazed, but one gets the sense that he’d be interesting to 
talk to, in a way that, say, Tom DeLay would not.)
I reckon that there are important lessons to be learned here 
which don’t emerge from Chris’s book. First, that there is a 
segment of the Republican party, which isn’t moderate in the 
traditional sense of the term, but which pro-science lefties can 
strike alliances with on a specific subset of scientific issues. To 
take one example, Glenn Reynolds has, in fairness, made vis-
ible his disdain for Republican posturing on stem cell issues. 
To the extent that the Christian right wants to impede this or 
that aspect of scientific research, which it sees as interfering 
with God’s plan, there’s probably a natural commonality of in-
terests that can be appealed to. Many techno-libertarians may 
not be especially reliable allies, but to the extent that many 
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of them do take their beliefs seriously, they’re likely to resist 
restrictions on contraception and reproductive technologies, 
on genetic research and related issue areas. By the same token, 
they’re obviously likely to be on the other side when the is-
sues involved are government regulation on environmental or 
health issues that arguably impinge on individual freedom.
Second, if you want to take seriously the threat posed by or-
ganizations such as Tech Central Station (which doesn’t seem 
to me to be sincerely committed to techno-libertarianism, but 
which is certainly willing to use techno-libertarian language 
to mask corporate interests), you have to recognize that part 
of their power to persuade is that they seem as though they’re 
committed to the development of exciting new technologies. 
When one wants to take on politicians like Newt who want to 
revive massively expensive programs for missile defense that 
don’t make sense in terms of basic science, one has to recog-
nize that a large part of these programs’ appeal is that they 
sound scientific. Indeed, they appeal to a set of myths that 
American scientists themselves helped to build and propagate 
during the Cold War in order to win resources. They haven’t 
been successful only because they’ve taught ‘the controversy’ 
but because they’ve also stolen some of the clothes of those 
they want to displace. Which makes the task of separating 
them out from genuine voices in the debate that much more 
complicated.
originally posted March 27th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/27/war-with-the-
newts/
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q The War and 
the Quarrels
Tim Lambert 
Readers of my blog will know that I have written about some 
of the same issues that Mooney describes in The Republican War 
on Science. For example, the way tobacco companies used groups 
they secretly funded to lobby epidemiologists to adopt “Good 
Epidemiology Practices,” “Practices” that would rule out 
finding second-hand smoke to be harmful. So I certainly agree 
that there is some sort of war on science going on, and I can vouch 
for the accuracy of Mooney’s book on the topics that I have also 
researched. What I am concerned about is the other part of the 
title: “Republican”. Is that justified? Are the Republicans the 
only ones making significant attacks on science?
The title put me in mind of a book from the 1990s: Higher 
Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science, by 
Gross and Levitt.
They identified a different group as being against science, 
the postmodern “academic left”, which doesn’t seem to inter-
sect much with Republicans. Are Mooney and Gross and Levitt 
just ignoring attacks on science from outside the groups they 
identified?
First, Gross and Levitt’s target, the postmodernists—Mooney 
ignores them. I think that is interesting because he doesn’t ig-
nore the left-wing abuse of science from opponents of geneti-
cally-modified organisms and animal rights activists. And he 
talked to plenty of scientists, so it seems that scientists don’t 
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feel themselves under attack from the postmodernists any more. 
Still, it would have been worthwhile drawing out the connec-
tions with the other attacks on science. For example, the tobacco 
companies’ approach to “Good Epidemiology Practices” seems 
pretty postmodern—they felt they could get the rules of science 
changed by lobbying scientists the same way they lobbied law-
makers.
Next, the Creationists. Gross and Levitt ignore them, though 
Gross went on to help write Creationism’s Trojan Horse: 
The Wedge of Intelligent Design, while Levitt blames 
pomo for softening up intellectuals for the attack of the creation-
ists.
Last, the anti-environmentalists. Here the two books intersect 
in the person of Dixy Lee Ray in Trashing the Planet, who made 
several pseudo-scientific arguments against ozone depletion. 
For example, (and people still keep bringing it up) “volcanoes 
put more chlorine into the stratosphere than CFCs” (debunked 
here if you are interested). Mooney shows how Sherwood Row-
land debunked Ray’s argument and documents how despite this, 
Republicans used Dixy Lee Ray’s volcanoes to push for a repeal 
of restrictions on CFCs. On the other hand, Gross and Levitt 
recommend Trashing the Planet and describe Dixy Lee Ray as 
“straight-shooting.” And they must surely have known that her 
volcano theory was completely bogus because they concede that 
CFCs cause ozone depletion, citing an article by Gary Taubes 
that specifically debunks her volcano theory.
I believe that Gross and Levitt damaged their credibility by 
ignoring and endorsing right-wing attacks on science. I don’t 
think that is true about Mooney, but it still would have been 
better to devote more space to describing the left-wing attacks 
on science.
Notes
I learned about Ray and Taubes and Gross and Levitt from Jeff 
Shallit’s review of Higher Superstition.
originally posted on March 27th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/27/the-war-and-
the-quarrels
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r If There’s a War, Please 
Direct Me to the Battlefield
Steve Fuller  
Perhaps authors should not be judged by the quality of in-
sight expressed in their epigraphs. But were one so inclined, 
one would have to conclude that Chris Mooney is profoundly 
naive about how science works. Indeed, he displays a level of 
naiveté about the sociology of science unbecoming in any 
other field of journalistic inquiry. (He may need my course 
on the ‘Epistemology of Journalism’!) Readers of The 
Republican War on Science are initially regaled with an epi-
graph from Steven Pinker, the first sentence of which reads: 
The success of science depends on an apparatus 
of democratic adjudication—anonymous peer 
review, open debate, the fact that a graduate 
student can criticize a tenured professor.
The pages that follow clearly indicate that Mooney be-
lieves not merely that this is a normative ideal toward which 
science as a whole aspires or to which pieces of scientific re-
search might be, in principle, held accountable. Were either 
the case, I would be on side with him. Unfortunately Mooney 
also seems to believe that science is normally conducted this 
way. Journalists, if anyone, should be scrupulous about dis-
tinguishing what people do from what they say they do. The 
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ethnographic methods so beloved in the more qualitative 
reaches of social science are historically indebted to just such 
first-hand coverage of previously neglected features of the life 
circumstances of workers and immigrants in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. However, Mooney’s trust in the peer re-
view system is based purely on high-minded hearsay. So let 
me report briefly as an ‘insider’ to the process. 
The only place a graduate student is likely to criticize a 
tenured professor—and live to fight another day—is an elite 
university, especially when the professor speaks outside his 
expertise (as Pinker often does). Moreover, this phenomenon 
bears no relation to the workings of the peer review process 
used to decide grants and publications. Contrary to the demo-
cratic image that talk of ‘peerage’ connotes, relatively few con-
tributors to any science are regularly involved in the process. 
For the most part, there are no conspiracies here. It is simply a 
pain to spend time evaluating someone else’s work when you 
could be doing your own work. Peer reviewing is a mark of 
‘good citizenship’, a euphemism for sacrificing a bit of yourself 
for the collective enterprise to which you would contribute. 
There are rarely any formal incentives to participate in the 
process. Of course, if you work in the same field, the burden 
is eased—but then ethical issues arise: Will you stymie your 
peer’s publication so that you can be on record as having said 
something similar earlier? In any case, funding agencies and 
academic editors tend to gravitate to a relatively small set of 
referees who exhibit both reliability and soundness of judge-
ment. While this process may resemble capitalism’s ‘invisible 
hand’, it is hard to see how it would conform to any reason-
able understanding of ‘democracy’. It is surprising Mooney 
trusts Pinker as a source for the virtues of the peer review pro-
cess, since Pinker’s last four books, all best-sellers, have been 
with commercial publishers. 
Science journalists are more like philosophers of science 
than either probably care to admit. Both are involved in pub-
lic relations work for science without pretending to be scien-
Steve Fuller46   
tists themselves. Of course, journalists and philosophers differ 
in deadline pressures, but they are similar in structuring their 
narratives around events, ideally ones where a discovery pre-
cipitates a decision with momentous consequences for an en-
tire line of inquiry. Who exactly makes the ‘discovery’ is an 
interesting question, since it need not always be the scientists 
themselves. It could be the journalist or philosopher, who re-
alizes that a specific moment marks a turning point in a here-
tofore open-ended situation. Much depends on how the event 
is framed: what exactly is ‘news’ here? For example, what was 
newsworthy about the mapping of the human genome—that 
it was done at all or that it was the outcome of a race between 
a publicly and a privately motivated team, or perhaps that 
both teams ‘won’ on their own terms? 
That many—perhaps most—would regard the bare fact 
that the human genome was mapped as news indicates just 
how little the general public previously knew about how much 
scientists know about our genetic makeup. From a strictly sci-
entific standpoint, mapping—or, more precisely, sequenc-
ing—the human genome was little more than an industrial 
application. The only problems concerned the efficiency of 
the mapping. That a public and a private team competed to 
map the genome speaks to the anticipated consequences for 
the biomedical sciences and biotechnology: There is poten-
tially huge consumer value in the mapping, but who will pay 
for what to be done? Perhaps that is a more newsworthy item. 
But one might equally argue that the segmentation of the sci-
entific reward system, whereby one team gets its intellectual 
property rights and the other its Nobel Prize, points to the 
deepest issue of all, one that threatens any unity of purpose 
that scientific inquiry might be thought to have. 
The question of intellectual integrity in both the journal-
istic and philosophical cases pertains to just how independent 
your representation of science is. Are you doing something 
other than writing glorified press releases for thinly veiled cli-
ents? It must be possible to be pro-science without simply ca-
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pitulating to the consensus of significant scientific opinion. 
With this in mind, I am struck by Chris Mooney’s professed 
journalistic method:
Let me explain my principles for reporting on 
science. In my opinion, far too many journal-
ists deem themselves qualified to make scien-
tific pronouncements in controversial areas, 
and frequently in support of fringe positions. 
In contrast, I believe that journalists, when ap-
proaching scientific controversies, should use 
their judgment to evaluate the credibility of dif-
ferent sides and to discern where scientists think 
the weight of evidence lies, without presuming 
to critically evaluate the science on their own. 
(p. xv)
The rhetoric of this statement is a marvel to behold. 
Mooney begins by distancing himself from colleagues who 
think they can pronounce on scientific debates. So, it would 
seem, Mooney defers to scientists. However, his own stated 
policy is ‘to evaluate the credibility of different sides’, which 
sounds a lot like constructing an independent standpoint 
from which to pronounce on scientific debates. Mooney may 
be caught here in a contradiction of purpose, but I might ap-
plaud the latter purpose as befitting a journalist who aspired 
to be the Walter Lippmann of the science field. Unfortunate-
ly, in the same sentence, Mooney dashes this hope by cashing 
out his idea of ‘evaluation’ in terms of simply reporting the 
considered opinion of scientists. 
Now, even this would not be so bad if Mooney had an in-
dependent way of gauging scientific opinion. But alas, he does 
not. Most of The Republican War of Science is about self-iden-
tified armies of scientists and policymakers. This is very much 
of a piece with the elite nature of political struggles in modern 
complex democracies. Nevertheless, these elites are a fraction 
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of all the people whose cooperation is necessary for any policy 
to take effect. Mooney’s oversight, which admittedly is char-
acteristic of most contemporary science journalism, would 
never happen in political journalism. Imagine a journalist 
covering an election who reported the opinions of candidates 
and party operatives, and then turned only to think-tanks for 
assessments of the merits of the party platforms: No public 
opinion polls to establish the breadth and depth of voter sym-
pathies. No probing interviews about which campaign issues 
really matter to voters. The natural conclusion to reach is that 
such a journalist has allowed herself to be drawn into the vor-
tices of the spin doctors, whose combined judgments may or 
may not bear some resemblance to the election outcome. 
For example, Mooney takes the judgement of the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) as the gold standard of scientific 
authority. Yet, it is nothing but a think-tank that Abraham 
Lincoln created to provide advice during the Civil War, which 
has been increasingly called upon by various branches of the 
federal government to research and advise on science-based 
policy issues. It is a self-selecting and self-perpetuating body 
of advisors that is not accountable to the rank-and-file of the 
scientific community, let alone the electorate at large. To be 
sure, NAS members are typically very accomplished scientists. 
But it is not clear that the quality of a scientist’s judgment is 
improved as her achievements are rewarded. On the contrary, 
both the rewarding community and the rewarded scientist 
may come to adopt a superstitious attitude toward everything 
the scientist thinks. The rewarders confer a halo effect on the 
rewarded, a compliment the rewarded return by mounting 
scientific hobby horses that threaten to distort science’s overall 
research agenda. 
A notable case in recent memory is the ill-fated Supercon-
ducting Supercollider, a Congressionally funded project to 
build the world’s largest particle accelerator in Texas. It is con-
spicuous by its absence from The Republican War on Science, 
though its heyday occurred during a Republican presidency, 
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that of the first George Bush. The NAS was strongly behind 
it, fronted by distinguished physicists like Steven Weinberg 
and George Smoot. The latter’s work on cosmic background 
radiation (a key to understanding the aftermath of the Big 
Bang) was indebted to a satellite launched by NASA, another 
of the NAS’s ongoing interests. This is clearly science done 
mainly by and for its elite practitioners who then gesture to 
its larger ‘cultural value’ to justify its support. Scientific elites, 
especially in physics, have adopted this bread-and-circuses ap-
proach to rebrand the grounds on which they were given carte 
blanche in the Cold War era. As should now be clear in ret-
rospect, the ‘Cold’ of the Cold War referred to the intellect, 
rather than the body, as the terms with which the Americans 
engaged in conflict with the Soviets: larger particle accelera-
tors demonstrated the nation’s capacity to harness energy to 
deliver larger weapon payloads; longer space voyages dem-
onstrated the nation’s capacity to, if not outright colonize, 
survey extraterrestrial domains. In the postwar thaw, these 
deferred preparations for war against a foreign foe were rede-
ployed for a more direct national conquest of the structure of 
reality itself. For scientists like Weinberg and Smoot, that was 
the whole point of the exercise all along.
There is no doubt that the Supercollider would have—and 
NASA has—produced good science. Indeed, good science 
can be produced about infinitely many things but budgets 
are limited and hence priorities needed. A science journalist 
should be sufficiently alive to this point to report consistently 
the likely beneficiaries and opportunity costs of alternative 
science funding streams. Much too often, Mooney writes as 
if the entire scientific community would benefit from one 
funding stream, while only pseudoscientists and their politi-
cal mouthpieces would benefit from another. Then those fall-
ing into the latter category are formally identified and, where 
possible, the patronage trail is charted. Were Mooney more 
sensitive to the institutionalisation of science policy, he would 
have recognized the asymmetry of his practice. More specifi-
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cally, he would have realized that two federal science policy 
bodies he holds in high esteem—the NAS and the erstwhile 
research arm of the US Congress, the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA)—operated under quite different princi-
ples, which came to the fore in the debates that eventuated in 
the termination of the Supercollider. 
The OTA, staffed by social scientists, tended to frame anal-
yses of the science policy environment in terms of a compre-
hensive statistical representation of the range of constituencies 
relevant to the policy issue: that is, including not only elite but 
also more ordinary scientists. On that basis, the OTA sug-
gested that if the research interests of all practicing physicists 
are counted equally, then the Supercollider should not rank 
in the top tier of science funding priorities because relatively 
few physicists would actually benefit from it. I say ‘suggested’ 
because, whereas the NAS typically offers pointed advice as 
might be expected of a special interest group, the OTA typi-
cally laid out various courses of action with their anticipat-
ed consequences. My guess is that Mooney fails to mention 
this chapter in the OTA’s short but glorious history because it 
helped to trigger the ongoing Science Wars, which—at least 
in Steven Weinberg’s mind—was led by science’s ‘cultural ad-
versaries’, some of whom staffed the OTA, whose findings 
contributed to the Congressional momentum to pull the plug 
on the overspending Supercollider. Although Mooney is right 
that both the NAS and OTA have often found themselves on 
the losing side in the war for influence in Washington science 
policy over the past quarter-century, their modus operandi are 
radically different. According to the NAS, science is run as 
an oligarchy of elite practitioners who dictate to the rest; ac-
cording to the OTA, it is run as a democracy of everyone em-
ployed in scientific research. 
I have no doubt that Republican politicians have tried to 
commandeer the scientific agenda for their own ends—in-
deed, ends which, generally speaking, I oppose just as much 
as Mooney does. Nevertheless, there are two countervailing 
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considerations. First, like it or not, politicians and not sci-
entists are the chosen representatives of the people. And, at 
least in the US, the ballot box more reliably removes subop-
timal politicians than peer review identifies suboptimal sci-
ence. Second, even the most competent scientists have rarely 
agreed on policy direction. While I bemoan this fact just as 
much as Mooney would (if he knew it), to believe otherwise is 
simply wishful thinking born of nostalgia for Cold War sci-
ence policy. 
First, the politicians are accountable to specific constitu-
encies in a way scientists, especially elite ones, never are. Poli-
ticians are ultimately in the business of promoting the public 
interest, and everything—including science—is a means to 
that end. Whether she decides to listen to the NAS or scien-
tists aligned with industry lobbyists, a politician’s fate is sealed 
in the ballot box of the next election. If a great many politi-
cians who spurn the NAS win re-election, then the problem 
would seem lie with the disgruntled scientists rather than the 
politicians. Perhaps voters are happy to take risks that scien-
tists find unacceptable. Indeed, perhaps voters are happy to 
remain ignorant about the exact risks because of goods that 
can be plausibly delivered in the short term. 
Suppose either or both of these speculations is correct. 
Does this demonstrate the irrationality of the American pub-
lic? Mooney himself prefers to point to the ignorance and du-
plicity of politicians, as if the citizenry, ‘properly’ informed, 
would reach conclusions that coincide with those of the NAS. 
(A philosopher of science, Phillip Kitcher, has indulged this 
fantasy as the idea of ‘well-ordered science’.) Either Mooney 
is being incredibly polite here or he simply hasn’t thought 
through the implications of his argument. Why doesn’t he 
argue that a body like the NAS should function as a second 
Supreme Court, with the right of judicial review over federal 
legislation? After all, if US policymaking is really drowning 
in so much bad science, then wouldn’t it make sense to sus-
pend some democratic control over the research (and teach-
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ing) agenda? In Mooney’s depiction, the pervasiveness of the 
problem certainly rivals that which brought a cabinet-level 
Department of Homeland Security into existence! 
My own heretical view of this situation is that even if US 
policymakers are influenced by a degraded form of science 
policy, it may matter much less than Mooney thinks because 
the checks and balances of the political system ensures that 
the potentially worst effects of such policy—just like the po-
tentially best effects of excellent science policy—are attenu-
ated in its many stages of implementation and administration. 
And if this is not enough, there is always the ballot box as the 
site of revenge on politicians who too closely aligned them-
selves with a failed science policy. A historical reality check 
is useful here. Like so many others who fret over the current 
state of science, Mooney compares the Republican politicisa-
tion of science with Lysenkoism, the doomed Soviet agricul-
tural policy based on a version of Neo-Lamarckian genetics 
that comported with the ideology of dialectical materialism 
but not with the facts of heredity. And like so many others be-
fore him, Mooney makes the mistake of concluding that the 
main problem with Lysenkoism was that it tailored science to 
fit a preconceived political agenda rather than allow science 
to speak truth to power. However, this conclusion only makes 
sense with 20/20 hindsight, since Lysenko and his Stalinist 
admirers were involved in at least as much self-deception as 
deception. Nevertheless, what could have been noted even at 
the outset—and had been noted by consistent opponents like 
Michael Polanyi—was that the Soviet science system did not 
permit the fair testing of Lysenkoist knowledge claims. 
It is disingenuous to think that science policies will not 
have elective affinities with the interests of the dominant po-
litical party. Mooney admits as much in his close association 
of what he regards as good science with the interests of Dem-
ocrats and moderate Republicans currently out of favour in 
Washington. The real question is whether a science policy, re-
gardless of its political origins, is subjected to sufficient scru-
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tiny on the path to mass realization. While it would be nice to 
require every policy to satisfy state-of-the-art tests before it is 
unleashed on the public, something comparable may be simu-
lated by having the policy pass through many different sets of 
eyes (of, say, bureaucrats), each attuned to different interests 
and hence motivated to troubleshoot for different problems. 
And if real problems pass unnoticed, then there is always the 
ballot box—hopefully enhanced by the spadework of investi-
gative science journalists! 
In short, the lesson of Lysenkoism is not to beware the 
politicisation of science, but to beware the authoritarian politi-
cisation of science. The democratic politicisation of science—
of precisely the sort encouraged by the federalist construction 
of the US Constitution—is fine. To be sure, I don’t mean to 
counsel a panglossian complacency toward the general state-
of-affairs Mooney describes. But as it stands, it seems to me 
that the best course of action for those interested in improv-
ing the quality of science in policymaking is simply to try 
harder within the existing channels—in particular, to culti-
vate constituencies explicitly and not to rely on some mythical 
self-certifying sense of the moral or epistemic high ground. 
Sometimes I feel that the US scientific establishment and the 
Democratic Party are united in death’s embrace in their fail-
ure to grasp this elementary lesson in practical politics.
This raises the second countervailing consideration: sci-
ence, depending on how you look at it, is a many-splendored 
thing or a house divided against itself. It is not by accident that 
the NAS was formed during the Civil War. Warfare, in both 
its preparation and execution, has provided the only reliable 
pretext for consolidating national scientific resources, where 
scientists have arguably spoken in one voice. Otherwise, scien-
tists have been loath to form representative bodies that go be-
yond narrow disciplinary interests, and these typically more 
at a national than an international level. Considering that sci-
entific fields of inquiry have universalist aspirations, this so-
ciological fact is striking—as well as having been an endless 
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source of disappointment for J.D. Bernal and other Marxists 
who hoped that scientists could be organized worldwide to 
lead a proletarian revolution in the twentieth century. 
Indeed, Mooney’s jeremiad against the influence of scien-
tists in the pockets of industry might best be read as evidence 
that scientific competence is itself no guarantee of political 
allegiance. This is less because scientists compromise the in-
tegrity of their expertise than their expertise is genuinely open 
to multiple applications and extrapolations, which may con-
tradict each other. Whatever ‘value-freedom’ science enjoys 
lies precisely here. It arises as a by-product of the controlled 
settings in which scientific expertise is typically honed and 
tested. These always differ sufficiently from policy settings 
to allow for substantial disagreements. I would go so far as to 
suggest that much of what passes for ‘data massaging’, where-
by empirical results are revised to justify a preferred policy op-
tion, may be explained this way. The primary sin in this case 
is one of omission—namely, of alternative trajectories that 
may be plotted from the same data, which in turn forecloses 
the opportunity for serious criticism of the preferred policy. 
The controversy over Bjørn Lomborg’s The Sceptical Environ-
mentalist (not mentioned by Mooney) provides an object les-
son in this point.
Mooney does not take seriously that scientists whose re-
search promotes the interests of the tobacco, chemical, phar-
maceutical or biotech industries may be at least as technically 
competent and true to themselves as members of the NAS or 
left-leaning academic scientists in cognate fields. Where these 
two groups differ is over what they take to be the ends of sci-
ence: What is knowledge for—and, given those ends, how 
might they best be advanced? What Mooney often decries as 
‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’ of science amounts to his registering op-
position to the value system in which many politicians and 
scientists embed scientific expertise. For example, a quick-
and-dirty way to sum up the difference between scientists 
aligned with industrial and environmental interests is that 
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the former are driven by solving and the latter by preventing 
problems. The former cling to what is increasingly called the 
proactionary principle, the latter to the more familiar precau-
tionary principle. 
Industry scientists function against the backdrop of an 
endless growth economy in which the maxim, ‘Necessity is 
the mother of invention’, is a source of inspiration not desper-
ation. Any new product is bound to generate new problems, 
but those are merely opportunities for the exercise of human 
ingenuity—not to mention the generation of more corporate 
profits. That certain people are hurt by such reckless innova-
tion must be weighed against those others who would have 
been hurt without it, as well as the likely costs incurred by the 
available policy alternatives. In contrast, environmental sci-
entists presuppose a steady-state economy, where the ultimate 
concern is that our actions reflect a level of restraint compat-
ible with maintaining a ‘balance’ in nature. This vision tends 
to privilege our current understanding of the future, includ-
ing future harms, even though in the long term our under-
standing is itself likely to change, as we learn more. Thus, 
there is a risk when going down the precautionary route that 
the only ‘steady-state’ being promoted is that of our knowl-
edge, not of reality itself, as we prevent ourselves from taking 
risks that might serve to expand our capacity for action. Of 
course, environmentalists rightly ask who has licensed indus-
trial scientists to risk other people’s lives in this fashion, which 
after all guarantees only profits for their paymasters and not 
progress for all. However, these very same critics typically 
would also curtail experimentation on animals for similarly 
risky purposes. The result looks like a fear-based policy of 
epistemic ossification that rivals the sort of ‘faith-based’ sci-
ence policy that Mooney decries in creationists and intelligent 
design theorists.
I don’t intend to resolve this conflict in scientific world-
views here. Both lay legitimate claim to advancing both sci-
ence and the public interest. To be sure, the priorities of each 
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are different, especially with respect to intertemporal issues, 
i.e. the relation of the short-term and the long-term. Neither 
world-view is especially prone to malice or incompetence, but 
there are clear reasons why certain constituencies might pre-
fer one rather than the other. Moreover, the end of the Cold 
War has made the need for choice more evident. In my in-
augural lecture as Professor of Sociology and Social Policy at 
Durham University in 1995, I argued that the status of sci-
ence in society is shifting from that of seculariser to that of 
secularised: the ultimate moment of sociological reflexivity. I 
developed this argument in a series of works, starting with 
Science (Open University Press and University of Minneso-
ta Press, 1997), The Governance of Science (Open University 
Press, 2000) and most recently, The Philosophy of Science and 
Technology Studies (Routledge, 2006). The basic idea is that 
without a state-backed unity of purpose for science, instanti-
ated in a centralized peer-reviewed system of research fund-
ing, science is bound to gravitate in many different directions, 
according to the strength of competing constituencies. This 
is the pattern exhibited by Christianity, once the secular rul-
ers of Europe no longer required the approval of the Roman 
Catholic Church. Many rival Christian churches emerged in 
this religious free zone, each directly appealing to people’s 
interests, forgoing abstract arguments that in the past only 
served to exercise authority over those people. In such a mar-
ket environment, the religious concomitant of secularisation 
has been evangelism. 
An analogous ‘science evangelism’ is readily seen today in 
the eclipse of state-based physics-oriented research funding by 
client-driven biomedical research. Whereas the citizenry used 
to dispose of their taxes to fund science as insurance against 
the vague but real sense of nuclear annihilation, nowadays 
they conceive of science as a high-tech service customized to 
their wants and needs. Perhaps politicians and the general 
public seem so much less informed about science than ever 
because decisions about science are being placed more square-
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ly in their hands. This is similar to what happened once the 
Bible was translated into the vulgar European languages, and 
believers were empowered to interpret the text for themselves. 
In the past, one could simply trust a state-licensed, profes-
sionally sanctioned peer review system to apply good science 
in a good way to good ends. People may have been just as ig-
norant, if not more so, but it didn’t matter because they never 
had to take the funding decisions themselves. Like a nostal-
gic Catholic who in the wake of the Protestant Reformation 
thinks Christendom can be healed by returning to the papal 
fold, Mooney would have us to return to the science-authori-
tarian days of the Cold War, which was actually an aberration 
in the political history of science. 
Of course, in matters of education, the scientific estab-
lishment has never had such an authoritative hold. By the 
standards of democracies in the developed world, the US is 
remarkable in lacking a national education ministry capable 
of enforcing uniform curricula for primary and secondary 
schools. Curricular guidelines are left to the states, and exact-
ly how they are met—by what textbooks and teaching meth-
ods—is typically entrusted to local school districts. All of this 
is by constitutional design, reflecting the nation’s founding 
by religious dissenters who had been disenfranchised in their 
native Britain. This has given the US a historic reputation for 
pedagogical innovation and experimentation—instances of 
which have been both emulated and discarded, depending on 
their results. However, this tendency has increasingly run up 
against the Constitution’s First Amendment, which prevents 
the monopolization of public life, especially public school 
classrooms, by a single faith. Notwithstanding the logical leap 
required to move from a prevention of religious monopoly to 
a prevention of religious expression altogether, this has been 
the general course taken by the US legal system toward the 
inclusion of religious considerations in the science curriculum 
over the past eighty years, since the notorious Scopes ‘Mon-
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key Trial’ over the teaching of Darwin’s theory of evolution 
by natural selection. 
Like most liberal commentators who have studied the 
rise of scientific creationism and intelligent design theory, 
Mooney can only see the hand of the religious right at work. 
Yet, there is more to this organized intellectual opposition to 
the Neo-Darwinian paradigm in biology. Let me concede at 
the outset some basic facts. Yes, a line of descent can be drawn 
from high school science textbooks espousing Biblical liter-
alism to ones now espousing intelligent design. Yes, there is 
probably a strong desire, perhaps even a conspiracy, by funda-
mentalists to convert the US to a proper Christian polity, one 
that is epitomized by the notorious ‘Wedge Document’ (more 
about which below) circulating at the Discovery Institute, the 
Seattle-based think-tank that has become the spiritual home 
of anti-Darwinism. But just how seriously should these facts 
be taken? After all, every theory is born in an intellectual state 
of ‘original sin’, as it is actively promoted by special interests 
long before it is generally accepted as valid. It is therefore es-
sential to monitor the theory’s development—especially to see 
whether its mode of inquiry becomes dissociated from its ori-
gins. So, while intelligent design theory may appeal to those 
who believe in divine creation, its knowledge claims, and their 
evaluation, are couched in terms of laboratory experiments 
and probability theory that do not make any theistic refer-
ences. Of course, this does not make the theory true but (so I 
believe) it does make it scientific. 
Suppose we took the pulse of Darwinism in 1909, fifty 
years after the publication of The Origin of Species but still a 
quarter-century before Mendelian genetics was generally ac-
cepted as providing the mechanism for an otherwise elusive 
process of natural selection. We would say that the theory’s 
main backers were located outside the universities—even out-
side the emerging lab-based biological sciences. To be sure, the 
backers were not trivial players in the knowledge politics of 
the day. They included popular free market intellectuals like 
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Herbert Spencer, as well as many ‘captains of industry’ whose 
self-understanding motivated their support of the fledgling 
fields of the social sciences, where ‘Social Darwinism’ pro-
vided a powerful explanatory and legitimatory resource for 
the march of capitalism. 
It is common for Darwinists to airbrush away this bit of 
their history, which draws attention to the fact that while biol-
ogists struggled to identify the causal mechanism responsible 
for the striking pattern of common descent and differential 
evolution that Darwin recorded in nature, congenial ideologi-
cal currents—including eugenics and scientific racism—kept 
the theory in the public eye. Thus, it is striking that the Dar-
win exhibition currently at the American Museum of Natural 
History in New York gives the misleading impression that any 
association between Darwin’s theory and Thomas Malthus’ 
anti-welfarist tract, Essay on Population is purely coincidental. 
Yet, Darwin himself acknowledged—and Darwin’s admirers 
assumed—the profundity of Malthus’ insight into the normal 
character of mass extinction, given the inevitability of resource 
scarcity. Contrary to the accounts usually given of Darwin’s 
reception, what was provocative about The Origin of Species 
was not the prospect that a theory of plant and animal spe-
cies could also explain humans, but the exact opposite: that a 
theory so obviously grounded in the explanatory framework 
of laissez faire capitalism could be generalized across all of na-
ture. Thus, Darwin’s toughest critics came from the physical 
and biological sciences, not the social sciences. 
The ascent of Darwinism makes one wonder when the 
theory passed from being a well-evidenced ideology (say, like 
Marxism) to a properly testable science. Would it have passed 
the criteria used nowadays to disqualify creationism and intel-
ligent design theory in, say, 1925, the time of the Scopes Trial? 
Probably not, since Darwinists still couldn’t quite square their 
claims with cutting-edge genetics. However, it was equally 
clear that Darwinism enjoyed enormous support among self-
styled progressive elements in American society who found lo-
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cally controlled school boards to be among the last bastions of 
intellectual backwardness. In this respect, the American Civil 
Liberties Union’s intervention in State of Tennessee v. John T. 
Scopes, which turned it into a showcase trial, employed a more 
successful version of the strategy now being carried out by 
the Discovery Institute and other organizational vehicles for 
realizing the ‘Wedge Document’. Just as the ACLU helped to 
drive a wedge between the teaching of science and theology, 
the Discovery Institute would now drive a wedge between the 
teaching of science and anti-theology, or ‘methodological nat-
uralism’ as it is euphemistically called. 
You would be right to suspect that I treat the two ‘wedg-
es’ as morally equivalent: Both should be allowed to flourish 
under the aegis of American democracy. As Darwinism slow-
ly, fitfully but finally made its way into high school and col-
lege classrooms, the theory was developed in new directions, 
integrated with new bodies of knowledge, virtually—but of 
course never quite—distancing itself from its capitalist and 
racist roots, especially in cognate fields like socio-biology and 
evolutionary psychology. I imagine a comparable fate awaits 
intelligent design theory over the coming decades. This prog-
nosis requires some justification since I would be the first to 
admit that proponents of intelligent design theory have not 
always placed themselves in the best possible light. At the 
same time, the near-hysterical response of the Neo-Darwinist 
forces is itself quite revealing. Mooney reduces the entire issue 
to a witch hunt about whether intelligent design theory is ‘re-
ally’ creationism in disguise, which for him is tantamount to 
showing it’s non-science, if not outright anti-science. 
Already at this point, Mooney is guilty of two errors, one 
for which he cannot be held entirely responsible: he follows 
the baleful tendency in contemporary US legal thinking that 
treats ‘science’ and ‘religion’ as mutually exclusive, rather than 
orthogonal, categories. However, the second error goes to 
Mooney’s journalistic acumen: instead of constructing an in-
dependent standpoint from which to evaluate scientific merits 
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of Neo-Darwinism and intelligent design theory, Mooney’s 
repeated practice is to ask Neo-Darwinists their opinion of 
work by intelligent design theorists but not vice versa. The 
results should surprise no one. Such opinion may indeed be 
expert but it is unlikely to be unprejudiced. 
By the end of this witch hunt, clearly exasperated by his 
quarry, Mooney exclaims that Darwin’s theory of evolution 
is ‘one of the most robust theories in the history of science’ 
(p. 190). I paused to wonder exactly what he might mean and 
how he might know it. It’s certainly true that Darwinism has 
had a persistent following for nearly 150 years, regardless of 
its evidential support. Moreover, Darwinism is philosophical-
ly ‘robust’ insofar as it has caused philosophers to alter their 
definitions of science to accommodate a research programme 
that clearly does not fit the mould of Newtonian mechanics. 
It’s also true that most practicing biologists profess a belief 
in Darwinism, though the impact of that belief on day-to-
day empirical research is harder to establish. For example, 
Science magazine declared 2005 the Year of Evolution, but 
what they meant by ‘evolution’ relates rather loosely to what 
Darwin himself talked about. The magazine cited three de-
velopments: the sequencing of the chimpanzee genome, the 
mapping of the genetic variability of human diseases, and the 
emergence of a new species of bird. Only the last conforms 
to Darwin’s own methods. Whereas he regarded natural se-
lection as a process that occurred spontaneously in the wild 
and operated mainly on groups of organisms, today’s break-
throughs in evolution occur mainly in the laboratory, often 
at the genomic or sub-genomic level, and are the product of 
explicit experimental interventions. That these two quite dif-
ferent senses of ‘natural selection’—sometimes distinguished 
as ‘macroevolution’ and ‘microevolution’—are seen by palae-
ontologists and geneticists alike as subsumed under the same 
‘Neo-Darwinian synthesis’ is regarded by many historians as 
the most singular rhetorical achievement in science.
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A good way to appreciate the intellectual challenge posed 
by intelligent design theory—regardless of what one makes 
of its origins—is to consider the rhetorical character of Neo-
Darwinism. No doubt the word ‘rhetorical’ will seem too 
provocative for some readers, but it is meant quite literally. 
Although Darwinism starts in, say, 1860, and modern genet-
ics is underway by, say, 1900, it is only in the period 1930-
40 that the Neo-Darwinian synthesis is forged, providing the 
covering theory for modern biological research. The main 
feat, achieved most clearly by Theodosius Dobzhansky’s Ge-
netics and the Origins of Species in 1937, was to persuade natu-
ral historians in Darwin’s research tradition and laboratory 
geneticists in Mendel’s research tradition of a strong analogy 
between their methodologically rather different pursuits. In 
time, macroevolution and microevolution came to be under-
stood as ‘evolution’ in exactly the same sense. A comparable 
development for some aspiring covering theory of the social 
sciences would be to convince, say, historical anthropologists 
and experimental economists that the ‘markets’ unearthed in 
the ancient world and constructed in the laboratory are to be 
explained by the same mechanisms, which the latter research 
environment reveals in their pure form. Among the obstacles 
to such a synthesis being forged in the social sciences include 
the perceived incommensurability between ‘qualitative’ and 
‘quantitative’ research methods. One consequence of the 
Neo-Darwinian synthesis was to break down these Aristote-
lian hang-ups, which had also existed in biology, permitting 
both methods to migrate across the micro-macro divide with 
fruitful research results. 
Thus, by no means do I wish to dismiss the Neo-Dar-
winian synthesis out of hand. Its construction has much to 
teach the social sciences, in which progress has been retarded 
by the sort of ‘metaphysical’ suspicion that Neo-Darwinism 
gladly suspends. Nevertheless, there remain fault lines in the 
synthesis, which occasionally surface, especially in the popu-
lar science literature, where the underlying assumptions and 
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projected implications of empirical knowledge claims are dis-
cussed more openly than is normally permitted in the consen-
sus-driven world of peer review. Mooney could have uncovered 
these fault lines had he asked two kinds of biologist, a field 
scientist and a lab scientist, what the theory of ‘evolution by 
natural selection’ is supposed to be about. The lab scientist 
would probably say that it’s a model of potentially universal 
scope, with the actual history of life on earth as merely one—
and perhaps not even the most important—confirmation of 
the theory. She would probably not lose too much sleep, were 
she to learn that natural selection proves insufficient to the 
task of explaining the entire history of life on earth because 
the model still applies in all sorts of smaller and maybe even 
larger domains (e.g. Lee Smolin’s theory of cosmological selec-
tion). In contrast, the field scientist would turn the tables and 
say quite plainly that the theory of natural selection is exactly 
about the actual history of life on earth, and that the fate of 
the theory rests precisely on the extent to which it explains the 
patterns that Darwin and subsequent natural historians have 
found. Everything else is merely a metaphorical extension of 
the original theory. 
This is quite a serious difference of opinion in how one 
defines a theory’s referent. Perhaps, then, Neo-Darwinism is 
so ‘robust’ because it is so strategically vague—or should I 
say, ‘adaptive’! Nevertheless, the fault lines are periodically 
revealed. The late Stephen Jay Gould, whose expertise was 
closest to Darwin’s own (not least in his ignorance and dis-
dain of lab-based science), fits my ‘field scientist’ to a tee. Not 
surprisingly, then, as the evidence from extant and extinct 
creatures suggested the insufficiency of natural selection as 
an overarching explanation for the actual history of life on 
earth, he became pan-Darwinism’s fiercest critic. Many Neo-
Darwinists have not only decried Gould’s perceived defection 
from the fold but have more harshly criticized intelligent de-
sign theorists for trying to get some mileage from Gould’s 
apostasy. But this is to suggest that the Neo-Darwinists have 
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proprietary rights over the entire history of biology. Yet, Neo-
Darwinism’s own pivotal mechanism—what is now called 
‘Mendelian genetics’—was contributed by people who held 
the counter-Darwinian assumption that every member of a 
species, regardless of species history, is programmed with a 
reproductive propensity. That assumption is a legacy of spe-
cial creationism, a research tradition in natural history that 
connects the devout Christians, Linnaeus, Cuvier and Men-
del. To be sure, many of its elements have been subsumed by 
the Neo-Darwinian synthesis. But why can’t intelligent de-
sign theorists reclaim this subsumed tradition as their own to 
develop the biological sciences in a different direction? In that 
case, Gould is rightly invoked as an ally—if only in a back-
handed way—because he stuck to Darwin’s original formula-
tion of evolutionary theory and found it empirically wanting, 
whereas Neo-Darwinists have shifted the goalpost to make it 
seem as though the theory’s validity does not rest mainly on 
evidence from the field.
In short, intelligent design theorists should treat what evo-
lutionists regard as a broadening of their theory, which corre-
sponds to the ascendancy of lab-based research, as involving 
a thinning of the theory’s content. I was struck by this point 
as an expert witness for the defence in the recent Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area School District, the first test case for the inclusion 
of intelligent design theory in public schools. One expert wit-
ness called by the plaintiffs, whom Mooney also quotes as a 
source, was Robert Pennock, my contemporary in the doctor-
al programme at the University of Pittsburgh’s Department of 
History and Philosophy of Science. Pennock enthused under 
oath about an ‘artificial life’ computer programme that he and 
some colleagues at Michigan State University had recently 
written up for Nature magazine. To the unprejudiced observ-
er, the programme simply looks like a strategy for generating 
computer viruses without the user’s intervention, albeit within 
parameters that approximate the combinatorial tendencies of 
DNA. Yet, Pennock claimed that this programme ‘instantiat-
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ed’ evolution by natural selection. The metaphysically freight-
ed ‘instantiated’, much favoured by artificial life researchers, 
renovates the old theological idea (originally used to justify 
God’s Trinitarian nature) that essentially the same idea can be 
materialised in radically different ways. Too bad, under cross 
examination, Pennock wasn’t asked whether he thought his 
programme added to Neo-Darwinism’s success at explaining 
the history of life on earth—or merely substituted for it. So 
much for falsifiability!
Evolutionists have been allowed to hedge their bets in 
this fashion because, prior to the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, 
there had been no ‘robust’ theory of the biological sciences 
as a whole. Biology was a scientific free zone, which is easily 
documented by noting the non-university locations of many 
of its historic practitioners. Under the circumstances, it is 
easy—but no less unfortunate—that a journalist like Mooney 
should come to make a simple equation between Neo-Darwin-
ism and biological science as such. This leads him to suspect 
that intelligent design theory, which he treats alternatively as 
pseudoscience and antiscience, is conspiring to replace Neo-
Darwinism wholesale—perhaps with some sort of Biblical 
fundamentalism. This really does the theory a serious injus-
tice. At most, intelligent design theorists are guilty of oppor-
tunism, exploiting substantial differences of opinion already 
present in the Neo-Darwinian ranks, which the parties them-
selves think should be discussed in peer-reviewed publications 
rather than in the media, courtrooms and classrooms. Thus, 
intelligent design theorists typically accept exactly the sort of 
microevolution evidence that led Science to declare 2005 the 
Year of Evolution. But that’s because ‘evolution by natural se-
lection’ in these cases has been intelligently designed, namely, 
by the human researchers responsible for setting up the rel-
evant experimental conditions. But what would allow natural 
selection to work so decisively in nature, without the presence 
of humans? That was the question that really interested Dar-
win—and Gould. It drove the analogy between ‘natural se-
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lection’ and ‘artificial selection’, which of course refers to the 
human breeding of animals. At this point, intelligent design 
theory dissents from the Neo-Darwinian orthodoxy and re-
fuses to accept macroevolution as the final word. 
Moreover, there is a positive programme behind intelligent 
design theory, though its proponents have not been as vocal 
about it as they might. The programme requires some imagi-
native thinking about ‘anti-naturalism’. We need to pick up 
on the idea of ‘instantiation’ mentioned above. A scientifically 
tractable way of thinking about ‘supernaturalism’ is in terms 
of the same form, end or idea being realized in radically dif-
ferent material containers. However, some of these contain-
ers may be better suited than others for what they contain. 
Converting this general point into a programme of theoretical 
and practical problems renders ‘intelligent design’ scientific. 
(Herbert Simon’s classic The Sciences of the Artificial can be 
thus read as a secular tract on intelligent design as a metathe-
ory for all science.) Now, if we further suppose that humans 
have been created in the image and likeness of God—or less 
provocatively, that reality is in some deep way human-like—
then it becomes easy to think about life itself from a design 
standpoint. Our technologies are then lesser versions of the 
divine technology responsible for all the world’s creatures. By 
the same token, we can treat these creatures as prototypes for 
technologies we might develop to enhance human dominion 
over nature. Perhaps the most obvious of numerous historical 
examples is the study of birds for aviation technology. (More 
Unitarian Christians, like Joseph Priestley and perhaps even 
Isaac Newton, might say we converge with God at that point, 
but I offer no opinion on the matter.) In short, the biological 
sciences would become an advanced form of engineering, cor-
responding roughly to fields currently known as ‘biomimet-
ics’ and ‘bionics’, which draw very heavily and fruitfully from 
contemporary biology but without any theoretical commit-
ment to the Neo-Darwinian synthesis. 
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There is potentially quite a lot of money to be had by think-
ing of biology in this fashion, which I think helps explain why 
the Discovery Institute—founded as it was by technoscience 
sophisticates like George Gilder and Bruce Chapman—has 
supported intelligent design theory. To put the point blunt-
ly, they want to corner the market on ‘playing God’ by both 
supporting the requisite technological innovations and lay-
ing down the moral ground rules for their use. Here Mooney 
overlooked that Gilder’s 1989 bestseller Microcosm was one 
of the first books to herald the advent of nanotechnology (as 
‘quantum economics’). Had Mooney attended more to the 
continuities that have taken these young Rockefeller Repub-
licans of late 1960s to their current support of intelligent de-
sign theory, he might have also seen the general reluctance 
of the Discovery Institute to be too closely aligned with gen-
uine Biblical fundamentalists, as became clear were behind 
the support for intelligent design theory in the Dover school 
board in the Kitzmiller case. Indeed, it should not have been 
too much for Mooney to imagine that the Discovery Institute, 
whatever its intentions, is unlikely to succeed at spearheading 
some monolithic right-wing conspiracy, given that the fun-
damentalists who would be the foot soldiers simply want to 
read their biology off the Bible and not have to grapple with 
the scientifically informed speculations of William Dembski 
or Michael Behe. 
The Discovery Institute is of course only one of many 
think-tanks trying to jump start the future of science for po-
litical advantage. Indeed, on matters relating to cutting-edge 
nano-, bio- and info- technology research, one might wish 
to turn to the judgment of such entities before that of the 
NAS. Of course, this is not because the NAS does not uphold 
good science, but simply because such an elite institution is 
unlikely to have its ear sufficiently close to the ground really 
to know what is and is not feasible in the foreseeable future, 
which is essential for framing any general political guidelines 
for research support. (That the NAS does not move very fast 
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is symptomatic. Generally speaking, the peer review system 
has served to stagger publication, so as to allow a critical mass 
of researchers to become ‘pre-acquainted’ with impending re-
search findings. But as time-to-publication shrinks in even 
the peer-reviewed sectors of the internet, the advantage accru-
ing to those ‘in the know’ shrinks.) Imagine, if you can: What 
may turn out to be the best work is not being done by the ‘best 
people’ at the ‘best places’! Let me make clear that I do not 
wish to celebrate the diffuse and largely unmonitored—and 
certainly unregulated—nature of emergent technoscientific 
trends. But we are unlikely to win Mooney’s ‘Republican war 
on science’ if we cling to a nostalgic view of the authoritative-
ness of the self-selecting college of scientific cardinals repre-
sented by, say, the NAS. 
The genius of MIT’s Vice-President Vannevar Bush’s The 
Endless Frontier lay in persuading postwar policymakers that 
the surest route to produce science in the public interest is to 
let scientists decide the research agenda for themselves. Not 
surprisingly, he made the argument turn on national security, 
based on the distinguished academic scientists amassed at Los 
Alamos who built the atomic bomb. However, an alternative 
framework for federal science policy had been floated even 
before America’s entry in World War II by West Virginia Sen-
ator Harley Kilgore. He imagined a ‘National Science Foun-
dation’ as an extension of FDR’s New Deal. Kilgore proposed 
a science board in which two scientific representatives would 
serve alongside a representative each of labour, agriculture, in-
dustry and consumer groups. 
Like most astute observers at the time, Kilgore realized that 
innovative scientific research in the US was being conducted 
off campus, as academics saddled with heavy discipline-based 
teaching loads were lured to informally structured interdis-
ciplinary research parks like Bell Laboratories. He believed, 
I think rightly, that scientists—like other high-skilled work-
ers—would naturally gravitate to the best labour conditions, 
which could eventuate in the evacuation of scientists from the 
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public sector. Not only would it be difficult to monitor or 
regulate their activity, it would prove difficult to reap the ben-
efits implied by the Constitutionally enshrined idea of science 
as a ‘public good’. Using the Great Depression that ended the 
post-World War I economic boom as his benchmark, Kilgore 
believed that without state intervention, science would simply 
exacerbate class differences in American society. So, one of his 
many science funding schemes involved treating science edu-
cation as a form of national service, whereby the government 
would finance the training of academically suitable students 
on the condition that they would spend some years develop-
ing one of America’s economic backwaters.
Kilgore’s relevance here is that he quite explicitly wanted to 
politicise science—indeed, to mount an offensive against sci-
entists’ spontaneous free market politics. Moreover, Mooney 
would have probably found Kilgore’s politics attractive. I cer-
tainly do. Yet, Kilgore was in no doubt that good science could 
be done under both private and public regimes. However, by 
the time the vote on the establishment of the National Science 
Foundation reached the floor of Congress in 1950, Kilgore’s 
proposal had come to be seen through Cold War lenses as 
‘politicising science’ in a sense by then associated with Hitler 
and Stalin. Bush’s victorious alternative had the federal gov-
ernment create a protected internal market for scientific re-
search and later (with the launching of Sputnik) education. 
This has proved very costly and, not surprisingly, with the 
end of the Cold War, the federal government has gradually 
allowed science to revert to the pre-war free market state that 
Kilgore decried. If Mooney is genuinely interested in promot-
ing good science in the public interest, then he needs to ar-
ticulate a robust conception of the ‘public interest’. The New 
Deal was the last time that occurred in the US outside a con-
text of military preparedness. The legacy of that formulation 
is what remains of the American welfare state.
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PostscriPt
Chris Mooney concludes the preface to the paperback edition 
of The Republican War on Science with a plea for the scien-
tific community to engage in better public relations for their 
cause. Unfortunately, this is easier than done. Sometimes it is 
not even easily said. Mooney addresses his readers as the “re-
ality-based community,” a self-congratulatory phrase increas-
ingly adopted by US liberals, in equal measures obnoxious 
and desperate—especially given that members of this com-
munity find themselves on the outside looking into the seats 
of real-world power.
It is worth recalling that this phrase, perhaps with a nod to 
the psychologist Paul Watzlawick (who, with Gregory Bate-
son, invented in the ‘double bind’ diagnosis of schizophrenia), 
originated in a 17 October 2004 New York Times Magazine 
piece by Ron Suskind that included the following comment 
attributed to an aide of George W. Bush:
The aide said that guys like me were “in what 
we call the reality-based community,” which he 
defined as people who “believe that solutions 
emerge from your judicious study of discernible 
reality.” ... “That’s not the way the world really 
works anymore,” he continued. “We’re an em-
pire now, and when we act, we create our own 
reality [quoted to this point in Mooney, p. 257.] 
And while you’re studying that reality—judi-
ciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating 
other new realities, which you can study too, 
and that’s how things will sort out. We’re histo-
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ry’s actors… and you, all of you, will be left to 
just study what we do.”
In other words, the reality-based community are history’s 
losers, the sort of people whose political imagination is likely 
to be fuelled by that sublimated form of resentment Nietzsche 
called ressentiment. What makes ressentiment trickier than or-
dinary resentment is that those under its spell so fully accept 
their own inferiority that they end up converting that inferi-
ority into a source of strength. Thus, many of Mooney’s fel-
low reality-based communitarians take the minority status of 
their common belief in evolution by natural selection to imply 
that the theory is much too sophisticated for ordinary folks to 
grasp; hence the need for better PR. (Of course, this does not 
explain why the US, the world’s undisputed superpower in sci-
ence, is one of the few countries where evolution is not widely 
believed.) Mooney himself is a bit more circumspect: he seems 
to think that people are not too dumb but too busy to worry 
about science policy. This then begs the question: why should 
they worry about whether evolution is the only account of the 
origins of life taught in high school science classes?
Mooney’s concern feeds into what the astute US historian 
Richard Hofstadter has called ‘the paranoid style in American 
politics’. The style is tied to the founding idea of the US as 
making a fresh start in the history of politics, specifically so 
as not to repeat the mistakes of the past, which included the 
establishment of a state church. American paranoia runs very 
deep, perhaps most viscerally in the anti-Catholicism that rou-
tinely surfaced in political campaigns until John Kennedy was 
elected as the first Catholic president in 1960—even though 
Catholicism has been the religion with the most adherents for 
most of American history. However, anti-religious paranoia 
reached a high watermark in 1987 with the Supreme Court 
decision in Edwards v. Aguilard used motive—as opposed to 
method—as the main criterion for ruling that Creationism 
was a religious and not a scientific theory. Judge John Jones 
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had ample recourse to this precedent in his ruling against the 
Dover, Pennsylvania school board in December 2005, since 
the religious motives behind the promotion of intelligent de-
sign theory were always close to the surface.
The paranoid’s fatal flaw concerns not strict accuracy but 
proportionality of response. Thus, Senator Joseph McCarthy 
may have been correct that Communists were employed by 
the US government in the 1950s, yet that bare fact did not 
justify his scare-mongering and bullying tactics, which only 
served to undermine the civil liberties his inquiries supposedly 
aimed to safeguard. Similarly, the fact that the anti-evolution-
ary scientific forces have been propelled by religious interests 
should not be sufficient to disqualify their theories from the 
classroom. By analogy with the McCarthy witch-hunts, more 
damage is done to the integrity of scientific inquiry than to 
its imagined opponents, who, lifted of the burden of having 
to defend the scientific establishment, are then free to present 
their challenge in the spirit of open dialogue, a.k.a. ‘teaching 
the controversies’ (which, in this Orwellian environment, is 
said derisorily by evolutionists).
Is there more genuine intellectual disagreement between 
those who do and do not take Darwin to have laid the in-
controvertible foundations of modern biological science than 
among those who grant Darwin such an exalted status? In 
the current scientific cold war climate, the answer would 
seem to be obviously yes. However, the answer becomes less 
clear, once the Neo-Darwinian synthesis is seen as a relatively 
baggy theoretical construction, parts of which can be reason-
ably believed without believing the whole. It is telling that 
when sixty-seven national academies of science published a 
joint statement in June 2006 on the need to teach evolution 
as fact, the only beliefs clearly opposed by the agreed prop-
ositions were those of six-day creationists. For example, no 
appeal was made to natural selection at all, let alone as the 
primary explanation for evolutionary change. This was prob-
ably because the academies found natural selection a more 
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controversial thesis than, say, that life has existed on earth for 
1.4 billion years.
The airing of such thinly veiled disagreements is vital for 
the elaboration and development of biological science. How-
ever, this spirit is lost if ‘modern evolutionary theory’ (as the 
Neo-Darwinian synthesis is called by its proponents) must 
be accepted as a whole, perhaps even as a necessary condition 
for being taken seriously by the scientific establishment. The 
result, which I believe captures the current state of play in the 
US, distorts the intellectual horizon by minimizing differenc-
es amongst Darwinists while maximizing differences between 
them and their dreaded religiously inspired opponents.
A recent high-profile expression of this distortion may be 
found in the pages of Intelligent Thought: Science versus the 
Intelligent Design Movement, whose editor, the literary agent 
John Brockman, sent a copy to every member of the US Con-
gress. The letter is written to whip up a McCarthy-like 
frenzy that no less than American economic competitiveness 
and national security are at risk from the promotion of intel-
ligent design theory. Fortunately this manoeuvre has had no 
discernible effect on the elected officials. Meanwhile, starting 
in Fall 2006, at least two major British universities (Leeds 
and Leicester) have announced that their introductory zool-
ogy classes will devote some lectures to the controversies sur-
rounding evolution and intelligent design. 
August 23, 2006
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ji The Revolution 
Will Not Be Synthesized
Kieran Healy 
I am abusing my ability to post here rather than add a com-
ment to the ongoing thread discussing Steve Fuller’s re-
sponse to Chris Mooney’s book. I think—sorry, P.Z.—that 
much of what Fuller says is more or less right. To be more pre-
cise, I think the first half of his response to Mooney is pretty 
good, and there are some good bits later on, too. However—
sorry, Steve—I also think Fuller makes an error in the way 
he fuses his sociology of science with his policy recommenda-
tions about what to do about the Intelligent Design move-
ment. Moreover, he himself does the groundwork that makes 
the basis of the error clear. I’ll try to explain.
Here’s the argument. Much of what Fuller says in the first 
part of his post is good sociology of science. In particular, 
his image of science as a contested, politicized field is basi-
cally right, and—speaking as someone who believes that the 
present Administration is out to gut science it doesn’t like—I 
think he’s right that Chris Mooney is in danger of romanti-
cizing the practice of science. And I agree that, at bottom, the 
best you can do is fight your corner. As Fuller puts it,
It is disingenuous to think that science policies 
will not have elective affinities with the interests 
of the dominant political party… In short, the 
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lesson of Lysenkoism is not to beware the politi-
cisation of science, but to beware the authoritar-
ian politicisation of science… To be sure, I don’t 
mean to counsel a panglossian complacency 
toward the general state-of-affairs Mooney de-
scribes. But as it stands, it seems to me that the 
best course of action for those interested in im-
proving the quality of science in policymaking 
is simply to try harder within the existing chan-
nels—in particular, to cultivate constituencies 
explicitly and not to rely on some mythical self-
certifying sense of the moral or epistemic high 
ground. (p. 43)
Now, in my view, Fuller’s contribution starts to go wrong 
from about here onwards. He makes some strong points about 
the messy history of Darwinian theory between the contribu-
tion of Darwin himself and the mid-twentieth century neo-
Darwinian synthesis. He then argues that the twin “wedges” 
of the Scopes trial and the Discovery Institute’s efforts are 
“morally equivalent” and that the latter could develop in 
the way that the former did. The strengths and weakness-
es of Fuller’s arguments are fused together: he’s at his stron-
gest when retrospectively analyzing the different ways science 
might be politicized. But his argument is at its absolute weak-
est when making the case that the ID movement contains a 
positive research program, in addition to being parasitic on 
mainstream biology. There’s little reason to believe that this 
positive program is real, and—noted biologist George Gilder 
notwithstanding—the only reason to think it might be is an-
alogical: the Darwinian approach did grow from a somewhat 
similar social position a hundred years ago.
But this is the nub of the matter. Why should we, as more-
or-less interested actors in the field of science, let this single 
consideration outweigh any others—not least the sincere be-
lief that ID is politically motivated rubbish, for instance—to 
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the point that we would want to nuture ID in high schools? 
Early on in comments to his post, Fuller argues:
Why start teaching ID at the high school level? 
I received a lot publicity—and flak—for saying 
in the Dover trial that ID required ‘affirmative 
action’, i.e. that it could not be expected to pro-
vide a credible alternative to Neo-Darwinism 
without government intervention. It’s clear that 
the few people pursuing ID openly in universi-
ties are treated as intellectual pariahs, and un-
der those circumstances it’s hard to recruit the 
colleagues and students needed to convert an 
unconventional idea into a full-fledged research 
programme. One solution would be to teach bi-
ology as a much more contested field, attending 
to the role that ID- and even special creation-
ist thinking has contributed to what even Neo-
Darwinists regard as credible science, and that 
the Neo-Darwinian synthesis was forged under 
quite specific circumstances in the 20th cen-
tury.
The problem here is that Fuller has rebutted his own pre-
scription in advance. There is no reason to believe either that 
“Neo-Darwinism” really needs a “credible alternative,” or that 
ID is the entity to provide it, or that this entails that biology 
should be taught in high school in much the same way as 
the sociology of science might be taught in graduate school. 
As Fuller says himself, as Darwinism “slowly, fitfully but fi-
nally” established itself, it has “developed in new directions, 
integrated with new bodies of knowledge, virtually—but of 
course never quite—distancing itself from its capitalist and 
racist roots.” In other words, while no body of knowledge is 
ever fully emancipated from the social conditions of its pro-
duction and reproduction, modern biology’s relative success 
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in this respect means that it now sustains a wide range of 
alternatives to the main currents of thought in the field. So, 
why does it—or why do we—need ID? Not that the Discov-
ery Institute shouldn’t keep plugging away, if that’s what they 
want. Fuller’s good advice to Democrats applies directly here, 
too: “the best course of action for those interested in improv-
ing the quality of science in policymaking is simply to try 
harder within the existing channels.” The ID people are en-
titled to do this, and they’ve certainly been trying hard.
They are also entitled, frankly, to be crushed like bugs in 
the process. Sure, they’ll get control of a few school districts 
here and there, but—again, as Fuller says—they can be boot-
ed out later. Politically, I see no reason to support them. Sci-
entifically, there’s no compelling prospect of them being able 
to do anything of practical use that some better-established 
branch of biology can’t do already. And sociologically, I don’t 
see how Fuller’s own conception of the scientific field sup-
ports the kind of “affirmative action” strategy that he advo-
cates. Let them hammer away along with the rest of us if they 
like. But why should anyone care to the point of helping them 
out, especially when the mainstream is not, by Fuller’s own 
arguments, all that monolithic anymore?
The question remains as to why Fuller thinks the policy 
he advocates is a good one (other than the hope that, if ID 
does win out, by the early 22nd century he might be hailed 
as the greatest sociologist of science in history). Maybe he’s 
hoping for an earthquake in biology, a second modern revo-
lution in the field. But—as Fuller surely knows—scientific 
revolutions of this sort cannot be willed into existence. It’s not 
impossible that a revolution of this sort could happen—after 
all, Darwinism did it once already. Indeed, over the long run 
it’s inevitable. But you can’t intentionally induce this kind of 
revolution by means of policy or high-school curricula, for 
the same reason that you can’t force someone to be happy or 
consciously will yourself to sleep. If it happens at all, it will be 
essentially a byproduct of other struggles—politicized, messy 
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struggles, certainly. But while the revolution may already be 
brewing, you can’t schedule it.
Jon Elster makes the point nicely. We’d all like to be more 
creative and productive, whether as artists or scientists or 
what have you. Maybe we’d all like a revolution in science, 
too. However, as Elster points out, to believe we can engineer 
or will this directly
is the fallacy of striving, seeking, and search-
ing for things that recede before the hand that 
reaches out for them. In many cases it takes the 
form of trying to get something for nothing, 
to acquire a character or become ‘a personal-
ity’ otherwise than by ‘ruthless devotion to a 
task.’ In other cases it is accompanied by self-
indulgence, when one is led to tolerate errors or 
imperfections in one’s own work because one 
knows they sometimes prove useful or fertile. 
In particular, many will have come across the 
brand of scientist who excuses the one-sidedness 
of his work by the need for fertile disagreement 
in science.… this attitude goes together with a 
form of self-monitoring whose corrosive effects 
I have been concerned to bring out.1
Science really is structured in more or less the way that 
Fuller describes. But for that reason, his efforts to enhance the 
chances of the Intelligent Design movement are most likely 
doomed. I can’t say I’ll miss them much when they’re gone.
Notes
1. Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (Cambridge UP, 1985), pp. 107-8.
originally posted March 28th, 2006
http://crookedtimber.org/2006/03/28/the-revolu-
tion-will-not-be-synthesized/
    79
jj War over Science 
or War on Science
John Quiggin 
Since my initial contribution was a fairly straightforward re-
view, I thought I’d have another go, taking advantage of the 
contributions I’ve read.
It’s pretty clear that there is some kind of war going on 
involving Republicans and science, but, as with Iraq, I think 
it’s possible to distinguish two competing stories. One is that 
we are seeing a War over Science, considered as valuable ter-
ritory. In this story Republicans like science, and particularly 
the technology produced by science, but would prefer a more 
politically reliable science that always generated the kinds of 
results that suit their backers.
The other is a War on Science, in the sense of an attack on 
the entire scientific community and their claim that scientific 
method is a route to knowledge that, while not infallible, is so 
much more reliable than any alternative as to render non-sci-
entific approaches, such as magic, religion or rhetorical argu-
ment, irrelevant in any domain where the scientific method 
can be applied. Attacks on, and defences of, this claim were 
the central feature of the Science Wars of the 1990s.
Indeed, a striking feature of the Science Wars was the ab-
sence of a great deal of substantive concern over particular 
outcomes of scientific research, though there was more con-
cern about technological applications. When the critique of 
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the claims of science went from the general to the particular, 
it was quite common to see a focus on early 20th century eu-
genics or 19th century claims about the inferiority of women 
rather than on particular outcomes of contemporary scientific 
research.
As I read Chris Mooney, his central claim is that the War 
over Science, driven by the desire to get the ‘right’ results on 
issues like stem cell research, global warming, evolution and 
so on is being pursued with such vigour and lack of scruple as 
to become, inevitably a War on Science. Most of the commen-
tators so far have suggested that Chris has been overly polemi-
cal here, and that there is a large body of people, exemplified 
by Newt Gingrich, who have a very positive view of science, 
but assume that good science must produce results favorable 
to their notion of individual liberty. The influence of science 
fiction, much of it libertarian in tone, is, as Henry points out, 
significant here.
I think the position is more complicated. While the Newts 
like an idea of science, it is not the idea associated with the 
scientific method, and still less with the social institutions of 
science: peer review, replication, formal and informal meta-
analysis and so on. Just as Steve Fuller attacks these institu-
tions from an ostensibly leftwing position, the Newts attack 
it from the right.
Their favored idea is that of the inspired individual genius, 
who sees the truth in a blinding flash of insight, and over-
comes the scepticism of the mass of plodders through faith in 
himself (there may be female versions, but I don’t recall any) 
and the support of a small but loyal band of followers. More 
or less distorted views of Galileo, Einstein and others provide 
the basis for this view of science, as does the vast bulk of pulp 
science fiction.
This model has been adopted by a string of critics of main-
stream science, and of other academic disciplines. As I ob-
served a while back, the pattern was set by Immanuel 
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Velikovsky and has been followed by creationists, global 
warming ‘sceptics’ and so on.
As the lack of scientific support for favored Republican 
positions becomes more evident, we are seeing the transition 
from a War Over Science to a War On Science, involving at-
tacks on the social institutions of science, including journals 
like Science and Nature (here’s Michael Fumento at Power-
line), the idea of peer review, and scientists as a group, 
stigmatised by Tom Bethell as a white-coated priesthood of 
political correctness.1 The fact that Bethell’s work is promot-
ed by the Heritage Foundation, and that the same terms are 
being recirculated by the global rightwing commentari-
at is an indication that this is already a mainstream Republi-
can position, although perhaps not yet the dominant one.
Not surprisingly, the shift to a War on Science has seen 
a realignment of positions from the Science Wars. The Re-
publicans are now lining up with some of their erstwhile 
opponents, postmodernist and social constructivists in the 
humanities and social sciences, who can provide more sophis-
ticated arguments in the War on Science than those derived 
from Velikovsky and his successors.
Notes
1. Tom Bethell, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Science (Regnery 
2005).
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jk Man, You Guys 
Worked Me Hard . . .
Chris Mooney 
First, I want to thank all the contributors here for launching 
a very high level discussion. Because the separate commentar-
ies overlap in a number of thematic areas, they almost lend 
themselves to being read in a particular order for greatest ef-
fect—and that’s the sequence in which I will address them. 
Here’s the game plan:
First I’ll touch upon what I view as the argumentative over-
view posts. Ted Barlow provides a useful and accurate review 
of my book’s main thesis, and then John Quiggin’s first post 
goes into more detail, expanding the argument’s applicability 
beyond the U.S. to Australia, and beyond the issues I discuss 
to related ones like DDT. (Quiggin’s first post also helps me 
out with some of my critics, and I fully endorse his rebuttals.) 
My brief reaction to these posts will comprise phase one.
Phase two: John Holbo, Daniel Davies, and Henry Farrell 
dive in with thoughtful attempts to advance or reframe my 
argument, or to press me on matters such as what’s causing 
the “war on science,” whether I’m too polemical, and whether 
I can account for the Newtoids or please the “Enterprisers.” 
This is where things start to get fun.
Phase three: Tim Lambert raises the issue of the academic 
left and science, and then Steve Fuller gives us a case study in 
continuing antagonisms between said academic left and the 
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scientific community, including the dreaded National Acad-
emy of Sciences. This part is also fun.
Phase four: John Quiggin, who somehow seems to under-
stand my arguments even better than I do (and no, I am not 
being facetious), steps in to further elucidate what I’m say-
ing. Other authors should be so lucky as to have such an apt 
defender. I basically agree with everything Quiggin says, so 
at the end I will call “tag team” and leave you in his capable 
hands.
With that introduction, let me discuss the entries in more 
detail. Ted Barlow accurately summarizes my argument when 
he notes of political science abusers that, “the Republican 
leaders in question could have made arguments for their po-
sition by arguing that moral or economic criteria sometimes 
trump science” (p. 12). They certainly could, and for the sake 
of intellectual honesty and quality of debate I wish that they 
would. To be fair, most of today’s conservative Republicans at 
least try to yoke science-based argumentation to economic ap-
peals or moral considerations. George W. Bush’s early speech-
es on climate change, for instance, feature both a selective 
emphasis on scientific uncertainty and complaints about the 
cost of mitigation measures like Kyoto. Similarly, Bush’s 2001 
stem cell policy speech contained the false claim that “more 
than 60” embryonic stem cell lines were in existence—but it 
also contained plenty of moralizing. So it’s not that the right 
doesn’t make any other arguments besides scientific ones; and 
in fact, I suspect that conservatives often disregard expertise 
in economics or bioethics just as they do in science. But sci-
ence gave me enough to tangle with, so I carefully limited 
myself to challenging specifically scientific distortions and 
abuses (a point that will be relevant later when I discuss Steve 
Fuller’s post).
Moving on to the other summary-type post, John Quig-
gin shows that he has really gotten inside of my argument, 
allowing him to steer the vehicle to other locations with ease. 
I particularly enjoyed this comment: “The ultimate effect 
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of the Republican strategy is to constitute a complete paral-
lel universe, in which scientific ‘knowledge’ is derived from 
think-tanks and unqualified opinion writers rather than from 
actual scientists working on the topic in question” (p. 16). Ex-
actly. This attempt to construct a conveniently walled-off al-
ternate reality is particularly prevalent on the Christian right, 
whose adherents do their best to insulate themselves and their 
children from traditional university-based sources of scientific 
expertise. Not only do they flock to alternative universities 
like Liberty or Bryan College; they’re constantly minting their 
own scientific “experts.” Chapter 13 of my book was entitled 
“Sexed-Up Science,” but it might just as well have been titled 
“Three Daves and a Joel,” because it presents a kind of picture 
gallery of Christian right scientists who provide politically 
convenient arguments on emergency contraception (David 
Hager), adult stem cell research (David Prentice), and the 
health risks of abortion (David Reardon, Joel Brind).
Bringing up these characters, incidentally, allows me to 
clear up an issue that arises in John Holbo’s post (and thereby 
transition into phase two of the discussion). That issue is in-
tentionality. After all, political science abuse, as I’ve described 
it on the American political right, is not necessarily commit-
ted knowingly. Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn’t; my sense 
(after going for a swim in some of the tobacco documents) 
is that the plotting and cynicism tend to be more prevalent 
on the pro-industry side of the aisle. By contrast, I have lit-
tle doubt that strong Christians like the “Three Daves and a 
Joel” believe deeply in what they’re saying. Reardon has even 
made a comment, quoted in my book, suggesting that since a 
moral God made the universe, it must operate in such a way as 
to lead to his particular scientific conclusions about the health 
risks of abortion: “Because abortion is evil, we can expect, and 
can even know, that it will harm those who participate in it. 
Nothing good comes from evil.” Someone capable of making 
such a statement probably isn’t consciously aware of conduct-
ing a “war” on science; rather, he would appear to believe (de-
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voutly, if also conveniently) in a divinely designed world in 
which his conclusions must be valid by definition. But that 
doesn’t mean no “war on science” exists: add up enough foot 
soldiers like the “Three Daves and a Joel” and you’re sure to 
get one. So I continue to view the phrase “war on science” as 
a useful metaphor to describe the comprehensive assault upon 
scientific expertise across so many different areas of political 
salience, even if not all of these assaults are consciously in-
tended. A “war on science” (see chapter 10)is not necessarily 
the goal, but it is clearly the cumulative outcome.
Holbo raises another key issue that comes up sometimes 
at my public talks. He’s worried about the polemical packag-
ing of my argument (which, incidentally, I do not deny). Will 
some people be turned off by the title The Republican War on 
Science? Undoubtedly. Last I checked there are still plenty of 
Republicans out there. Still, I maintain that it is an accurate 
title: the abuses I’m describing really have become integral to 
mainstream Republican political strategy. However, if we are 
discussing issues of tact rather than of substance, then my 
reply to Holbo’s concern about polemicism would be the fol-
lowing: there are considerations of timing as well as zeitgeist 
to take into account. I might have written a less polemical 
book, and it might have been more persuasive to conservative 
“Enterprisers” who view themselves as pro-science (or at least 
to those Enterprisers who bothered to read it). But that book 
would not have spoken so directly to a moment in which out-
rage over the treatment of science by the Bush administration 
had reached a boiling point. There is a time for reaching out 
across the aisle, and there is a time for denouncing abuses in 
no uncertain terms. I think that we are in the latter period 
with respect to the treatment of science in the USA, and my 
tone reflects that.
But I suspect that Holbo still won’t be entirely satisfied: 
He wants a “polemic free” version of my book, one in which 
I “specify and document systematic tendencies on the right 
which are absent, or less present, on the left, and which are 
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not counterbalanced by uniquely leftish bad tendency.” With-
out demanding an advance from Holbo for the new project, 
let me counter that I do highlight and explore these tenden-
cies (which are generally not present on the left). They include 
1) a distrust of government (which funds lots of science and 
uses science as a basis to regulate); 2) a general tenor of anti-in-
tellectualism; 3) a broad distrust of universities (where much 
of science is conducted); 4) a strong embrace of Christian 
conservatism; 5) powerful pro-industry and free-market sen-
timent; 6) widespread proliferation of pseudo-academic (and 
pseudo-scientific) think tanks; and so on. These factors, when 
pulled together, take us pretty darn far towards understand-
ing why the right in the US behaves in the way that it does 
towards science. Perhaps I don’t cover all of this in enough 
detail for Holbo—which is fine—but on the other hand, I 
do seem to provide enough detail for Quiggin. Or at least so 
I assume, because he unintentionally answers Holbo’s request 
with this left-vs-right comparison, which pretty much sums 
up my own thinking:
There are few issues on which Democrats in the 
US, or social democrats and liberals elsewhere 
have taken a position that is obviously at vari-
ance with the findings of mainstream science. 
By contrast, there is almost no scientific disci-
pline, from geological analysis of the age of the 
earth to epidemiology to climate science that 
has not been subject to ideological attack from 
Republicans and associated interests. (p. 14)
This makes for a good segue into Daniel Davies’ helpful 
comments. He’s right that The Republican War On Science is 
a very American book, albeit one that’s had a pretty good re-
ception in the UK (I suppose because they’re so worried about 
us Yanks going off the deep end.) Davies says I’ve got the 
“causation wrong” in my argument, but I actually think my 
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causal picture (which, if I could draw it, would look more 
like more a web of arrows than a single arrow pointing in one 
direction) is complex enough to accommodate Davies’ com-
ments nicely. The American “anti-intellectualism” described 
by Tocqueville, in its modern incarnation, is a core ingredient 
fueling the war on science. The same goes for what Davies 
depicts as a human longing after a kind of unshakeable cer-
tainty that neither science nor reality can really deliver (this, 
I submit, characterizes the Christian right). However, I think 
Davies may be underselling the power of sheer economic self-
interest to explain much of what we’re seeing, especially when 
he writes: “there is rather less obvious economic interest in 
trying to deny the facts about global warming….” Um, come 
again? Global warming exposes the dark underbelly of the 
entire carbon-based economy. There is therefore a huge eco-
nomic stake in attacking this upstart “theory” and preserving 
the status quo.
Economics brings us to Henry Farrell, who gently con-
fronts me with a couple of characters who are not the political 
equivalent of cardboard cut-outs and who perhaps complicate 
my story: Newt Gingrich, Glenn Reynolds, and maybe (I’m 
struggling with this one) the folks at Tech Central Station. 
Farrell has a lot of insight into the ideas driving this crowd, 
and I don’t question his descriptions; in fact, I would add oth-
ers, like John Tierney and Ron Bailey, to the list. And I will 
also admit that there is something that is at least rhetorically 
powerful about techno-optimism; hell, five years or so ago I 
was a near-convert. Finally, I will concede that the techno-
optimists are great fun to make temporary allegiances with; I 
like to say that I agree with Reason’s Ron Bailey precisely half 
of the time.
But I’m not sure this crowd is quite as difficult for me to 
explain as Farrell thinks. The fact is, many of the techno-op-
timists are often very closely tied to industry—can anyone 
say Tech Central Station, or Michael Fumento’s love letters 
to ag biotech? More generally, if it weren’t for the prolifera-
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tion of conservative think tanks, I doubt there would be such 
a chorus of techno-optimism. This helps bring the phenom-
enon back under the umbrella of the “war on science” thesis 
in the sense that it links the libertarian technophiles to one of 
the right’s key interest groups—industry. I don’t doubt that 
the philosophy of techno-optimism exists or that it is a firmly 
held view on the part of serious thinkers; but let’s not forget 
the political mileu in which it arises.
Okay, on to phase III. Tim Lambert hits me in something 
of a weak spot: in the book I really ought to have discussed, 
at least briefly, the 1990s saga of the academic left vs. sci-
ence, which has largely subsided since that time. For what 
it’s worth, I did give my thoughts on this matter in a 2005 
American Prospect column, wherein I pronounced the “Sci-
ence Wars” of the 1990s over, having been supplanted by the 
dramatically more consequential “Science Wars” of the 2000s. 
Here’s a brief excerpt:
Even at the time [the 1990s]…the quest to root 
out anti-science tendencies in academia seemed 
a strange deployment of resources. After all, 
the Gingrich Republicans had just taken over 
Congress, set out to radically slash science bud-
gets, and preached denial about global warming. 
If there was a war on science afoot, university 
professors probably weren’t the leading culprits. 
Certainly they weren’t the most powerful ones.
Indeed, despite some undeniable academic 
excesses, the “science wars” were always some-
what overblown. The sociological, historical, 
philosophical, and cultural study of science is a 
very worthwhile endeavor. If scholars engaged 
in such research sometimes take a stance of ag-
nosticism toward the truth claims of science, 
perhaps that’s simply their way of remaining 
detached from the subject they’re studying. But 
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it doesn’t necessarily follow that these scholars 
are absolute relativists, to the extent of think-
ing that concepts like gravity are a mere matter 
of opinion. Social Text founding Editor Stanley 
Aronowitz has himself written that “[t]he criti-
cal theories of science do not refute the results of 
scientific discoveries since, say, the Copernican 
revolution or since Galileo’s development of the 
telescope.”
So my basic take on the “Science Wars” is that, although 
there might have been some genuine anti-science sentiment 
on the politically ineffectual academic left, the phenomenon 
was exaggerated and in any case, it’s hardly as worrisome as a 
similar sentiment on the part of our actual leaders. I do thank 
Tim for raising the point, though. And I might add that I was 
unaware that Gross and Levitt, who so powerfully slammed 
academic leftists during the 1990s for attacking science, had 
promoted Dixy Lee Ray’s outlandish ozone depletion contrar-
ianism (or her book generally). If so, that’s a significant hole in 
their pro-science armor.
But of course, there are some elements of the academic 
left that are actually still attacking science. Or, at least, there’s 
Steve Fuller, controversial intelligent design boost-
er. I don’t plan on engaging with Fuller on evolution and 
“intelligent design”; he has taken enough licks on this subject. 
But let me respond to some of his other points.
Generally speaking, Fuller doesn’t seem particularly con-
cerned about correctly limning my argument; most of the 
times that he actually engages with me it’s not the real me. 
Like the point about the Superconducting Supercollider—
this is no gap in my account. I deliberately avoided discuss-
ing fights over how to apportion and invest research funding 
because they raise complicated political issues that go far be-
yond mere matters of distortion, suppression, and so on. And 
contrary to Fuller’s suggestions, my descriptions of the sci-
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entific process hardly suggest someone who’s sociologically 
naive about the matter:
Scientists are human. They have plenty of foibles, 
and in some cases outright myths they tell about 
themselves. They also have values and agendas 
that factor heavily into their research decisions. 
Moreover, the inquiries and investigations of sci-
entists take place in a social and cultural context 
that shapes both their underlying assumptions 
and even (at least to some extent) how they mea-
sure and interpret nature itself. (p. 14)
It may be convenient to depict me as a sociological babe-in-
the-woods about science, but it wouldn’t be accurate. I simply 
think that science matters despite its obvious shortcomings 
(hardly a very radical point of view). As for graduate students 
criticizing tenured professors, funny how that very thing just 
happened at the Oregon State College of Forestry. Maybe Ste-
ven Pinker wasn’t so off base after all.
Moving on, I found Fuller’s comparison between the Of-
fice of Technology Assessment and the National Academy 
of Sciences interesting, especially since he claims the OTA 
was staffed by “social scientists.” While I’m sure there were 
a couple, I’ve met a lot of former OTA staffers, and none of 
them that I recall have been social scientists. Jack Gibbons, 
who headed the office for over a decade (and during the en-
tire period of its significant influence), was a physicist. This is 
important because Fuller is trying to make the OTA appear 
more sophisticated than the Academy; perhaps he does he not 
realize that several OTA staffers went to work at the NAS 
when OTA disbanded.
The point is, both OTA and the NAS are needed and im-
portant institutions, and their differences are more a strength 
than a weakness. We need both; losing OTA was a severe 
blow and we would be further hobbled without the NAS. I 
would really like to know how we are supposed to get actual 
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quality assessments of the state of scientific understanding if 
not from convening some of the leaders of the field, getting 
them to argue it out and write a consensus report, getting the 
consensus report reviewed, and so forth and so on. The pro-
cess is messy and imperfect, and occasionally even fails, but 
these reports have to be done by scientists, and there has to be 
a careful and uniform protocol set up. And of course, when 
you do set up the advisory process properly, you are pretty 
well assured of getting more reliable information than if, say, 
you just have the president sit down and talk with a sci-fi nov-
elist (to choose a non-random example). And everyone pretty 
much accepts this… except maybe for Steve Fuller.
Just one more point in reply to him, on the subject of sci-
ence and democracy. I obviously don’t want to suspend the 
democratic process in favor of some form of technocracy (talk 
about a straw man). Rather, I want to forge a more productive 
relationship between scientists and policymakers within the 
context of democracy, which will inevitably require setting 
up the scientific advisory process right. But that doesn’t mean 
I should have been out doing man-on-the-street interviews 
about science policy. This is obviously a fairly rarefied area, 
one in which political abuses will not even be noticed by much 
of the public, much less punished at the ballot box. We need a 
public that better understands science, and we need better sci-
ence education, but I’m not sure that improving either of these 
situations will necessarily help us to cope with the extremely 
sophisticated political attacks on scientific information that 
we’re seeing right now in American government.
And that, I think, provides an adequate reply to the Fuller 
treatise. Anyway, I needn’t defend myself further: John Quig-
gin has got my back in his second post. What he says. And 
thanks to you all for contributing.
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